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I.

INTRODUCrION

Transportation is one of the biggest issues facing local, state, and federal governments. The national transportation network is aging, reflecting years of disinvestment by federal and state governments.1 This
network must be upgraded and expanded to accommodate the increasing demands of domestic and international commerce. Furthermore, decentralized land development patterns, increases in per capita
automobile use, and continued growth and development in metropolitan
areas will cause traffic congestion to increase, placing greater demands
upon this aging and often inadequate network.
The greater Milwaukee area, as part of the Southeastern Wisconsin
region, faces critical choices regarding its transportation network. The
metropolitan area is being presented with a light rail and transit proposal
that represents a large investment in federal, state, and local funds, and a
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1. Bruce Cannon, ISTEA and FWHA Key Policy Priorities,paperpresentedfor the International City Management Association National Conference, (Sept. 20, 1993), at 5. While
travel growth has increased 3% annually since 1960, the growth in lane-miles since 1983 has
only been 0.15% per year. Highway spending has declined by more than 50% in constant
dollars since 1960, which is an average decline of about 1.5% per year. Id
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planning effort that rivals the construction of the region's partially completed freeway system.
This Article not only seeks to contribute to this regional discussion,
but presents a policy implementation analysis that may be useful to other
municipalities facing similar choices. This Article will: (1) provide a
historical overview of the region's freeway system through an implementation paradigm; (2) consider two federal statutes that impact transportation development-the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19902 and the
Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act (ISTEA)-and
how they impact transportation choices; (3) analyze the proposed light
rail and transit system for the Southeastern Wisconsin region; and (4)
consider the prospects for success of the light rail and transit proposal
and make suggestions for the regional transportation network, including
the now-assumed-moot issue of continued freeway construction.4 For
the sake of public policy, the author hopes that policymakers will consider all options that are available for improving regional transportation
networks. This Article will begin with an historical analysis of transportation planning in the Southeastern Wisconsin region. The history of this
region must be understood in order to learn from the mistakes and successes of the past. The light rail and mass transit proposal can only be
understood within this historicalcontext.
II.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE MILWAUKEE REGIONAL

FREEWAY SYsTEM

Planning commenced for the Milwaukee regional freeway system in
1946; the first hearings on its development were held in 1955, and the
first segment of the East-West freeway (Interstate 94) was opened to
traffic in 1962.5 By 1968, approximately sixty-five miles of freeways
opened up in Milwaukee County,6 including the East-West Freeway (In2. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1992)).
4. We need to look no further than Chicago, Illinois to see recent freeway construction.
The Elgin-O'Hare Freeway recently had its one year anniversary. This 6.5 mile segment, built
by the Illinois Department of Transportation, is used by 84,850 motorists daily and was the
first freeway constructed in Chicago in twenty years. Jerry Crimmins, Elgin-O'HareProves
Popularin First Year, Cm. TRiB., Nov. 2, 1994, § 2, at 1-2.
5. See MILWAUKEE CoUNTY EXPRESSWAY COMM'N, GENERAL PLAN: MILWAUKEE
CoUNTY EXPRESSWAY SYSTEM (Feb. 1955) (discussing the genesis of the Milwaukee County
Expressway System).

6. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, MINUTES OF INFORMATIONAL MEETINGS: ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL LAND UsE-TRANSPORTATIUON PLANS FOR
SoUTHEAsTERN WIScONsIN-2000, at 41 (1976) [hereinafter SEWRPC, Minutes].
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terstate 94), the North-South Freeway (Interstate 43), the Airport Freeway (Interstate 894), the Zoo Freeway (U.S. Highway 45), as well as
small portions of the Stadium Freeway (U.S. Highway 41), and the ParkEast Freeway (U.S. Highway 145). With the exception of the Lake Freeway-South (Interstate 794) construction in the mid-1970s (approximately
2.8 miles), all freeway construction was completed in the Milwaukee
area by 1970. Therefore, freeway construction was aggressively pursued
in the Milwaukee area from the late 1950s through the end of the 1960s.
Highlighting the importance of the Milwaukee County Freeway System, Harvey Shebesta, former district director of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, recently stated:
Our freeway system makes up only about 10% of the arterial
network in the region, but carries about 40% of the arterial traffic. If the freeways are not modernized with increased capacity
and improved safety features, more of our inevitable traffic
growth, including truck traffic, will take place on local streets, increasing the potential for accidents and increasing the need for
more frequent and costly maintenance. This, of course, means
higher taxes.
Segments of our uncompleted freeway system are carrying
traffic volumes 50% higher than their design capacity. For this
situation we can thank, in part, the far-sighted vision of The Milwaukee Journal Editorial Board, which opposed completion of
the freeway
system as originally planned in the late '60s and early
'7
'70s.

There is no denying the importance of the Milwaukee County freeway system to the overall health and growth of the greater Milwaukee
metropolitan area.
Initial planning and construction of the regional Milwaukee freeway
system was initiated and executed without the guidance of the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC); however,
in later years SEWRPC, as the Metropolitan Planning Organization
(MPO), would have far greater influence in the ultimate transportation
makeup of the region.
SEWRPC was created in August of 19608 to serve and assist local,
state and federal units of government in planning for the orderly eco7. Harvey Shebesta, Why TransportationFunds Must go to Freeways, Mmw. J., Aug. 14,
1994, at J5.
8. Wis. STAT. § 66.945 (1959).
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nomic development of Southeastern Wisconsin. 9 The role of the Commission is entirely advisory; participation by local units of government in
the work of the Commission is on a voluntary, cooperative basis. 10
SEWRPC has sought to grapple with various local manifestations of
larger national social and economic phenomenon justifying the need for
regional planning including: (1) unprecedented population growth and
urbanization; (2) greatly increased agricultural and industrial productivity; (3) increasing income levels and leisure time; (4) mass recreational
needs; (5) intensive use and consumption of natural resources; (6) private water supply and sewerage disposal systems; (7) far-flung electric
power and communication networks; (8) limited access highways; and
(9) automotive transportation." As SEWRPC has recognized, "sound
regional planning must be relatively long range, looking well beyond the
obvious needs of the moment and attendant expedient solutions."'"
Regional planning has three principal functions:
1. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of basic planning and
engineering data on a continuing, uniform, area-wide basis so
that, in fight of such data, the various levels and agencies of government, private enterprise, and interested citizens within the region can make better decisions concerning community
development;
2. Preparation of a framework of long-range plans for the physical development of the region, these plans being limited to those
functional elements having area wide significance; and
3. Provision of a center for the coordination of the many planning and plan implementation activities carried on by the various
levels and agencies of government operating within the region.' 3
Acting on these principles, SEWRPC began a three and one-half
year Regional Land Use-Transportation Study on January 1, 1963. The
purpose of this study was to prepare two key elements of an advisory
plan for the physical development of the region: (1) a land use plan, and
9.

USE TRANSPORSTUDY: INVENTORY FINDINGS 1963, at 2 (May, 1965) [hereinafter SEWRPC, INVEN-

SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, 1 LAND

TATION

TORY FINDINGS].

10. Id. Given the scope and nature of the region's problems, perhaps the time has come
to consider whether SEWRPC should be given expanded powers in terms of plan implementation at the local level. This does not, however, necessarily imply the need for a "Regional
Government."
11. Id.at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 2.
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(2) a transportation plan, with the transportation plan serving the needs
of the land use plan.14
SEWRPC chose transportation as the object of its first large scale
planning effort for four reasons:
1. The movement of people and goods within this rapidly urbanizing region is one of the most complex and difficult problems
facing public officials;
2. The existence of local traffic and transportation problems
(some very pressing), which could only be properly resolved
within the framework of a regional transportation planning effort;
3. The Commission, through close liaison with the State Highway Commission of Wisconsin, anticipated the fact that the Federal Aid Highway Act of 19621- would limit federal funds for new
highway construction after July 1, 1965, to those urban areas having established a comprehensive, areawide, continuing, cooperative transportation planning program; and
4. The Commission knew that a comprehensive approach to the
transportation problem would provide much valuable data for the
ultimate solution to drainage and flood control, sewerage, water
supply, land and water use, and other1 6resource related planning
problems prevalent within the region.
The initial step in this First Generation study was to compile economic, social, demographic, environmental, land use, and transportation
information from facilities throughout the seven County region constituting SEWRPC (Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, Ozaukee, Walworth, Racine, and Kenosha counties).' 7 For the purposes of this

Article, it is significant to note that when the inventory was taken in
1963, forty-two percent of the existing arterial street and highway mileage in Milwaukee County was found to be operating at or over design
capacity, evidencing congestion on the arterial and highway system. The
initial inventory also indicated that modified rapid transit service (buses
operating over a completed portion of the freeway system) had a positive community usage rate, in direct contrast to the otherwise steady decline in transit utilization throughout the region, indicating that
expansion of this transit method warranted careful consideration in the
14. Id. at 7.

15. Id. at 4-6.
16. Id.

17. See generally, SEWRPC,

supra note 9; SOUTHEASTERN WIS2 LAND USE TRANSPORTATION STUDY: FoREcASTS
AND ALTERNATIVE PLANs 1990 (June, 1966) (providing an extensive compilation of these
factors).
INVENTORY FINDINGs,

CONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N
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plan preparation.' 8 All future proposals for freeway construction contained increased provisions for limited rapid transit service.
Once this inventory was completed, SEWRPC prepared a second report that was concerned with: (1) the formulation of regional development objectives, principles, and standards; (2) the forecasts of future
growth in the region; and (3) the presentation and evaluation of three
alternative regional land use and transportation plans desired to meet
the anticipated growth and change. The three alternative plans were
designed in such a manner as to meet the approved objectives for regional development. They were prepared and tested using advanced
planning techniques and contained cost/benefit analyses as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of each. These alternative plans were distributed to all public officials within the region for their consideration
and comment. All of the alternative plans for the transportation system
were subjected to the following specific transportation objectives which
were adopted by the Commission after careful review and recommendation by the Technical Coordinating and Advisory Committee and the Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee on Regional Land UseTransportation Planning:
1. An integrated transportation network which will effectively
serve the existing regional land use patterns and promote the implementation of the regional land use plan, meeting the anticipated travel demand generated by the existing and proposed land
uses.

2. A balanced transportation system providing the appropriate
types of transportation service needed by the various subareas of
the region at an adequate level of service.
3. The alleviation of traffic congestion and the reduction of
travel time between component parts of the region.
4. The reduction of accident exposure and provision of increased
travel safety.
5. A transportation system which is both economical and efficient, meeting all other objectives at the lowest cost possible.
6. The minimization of disruption of desirable existing neighborhood and community development and the deterioration or destruction of the natural resource base.

18. SEWRPC,

INVENTORY FINDINGS,

supra note 9, at 171.
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A high aesthetic quality in the transportation system with

proper visual relation of the major transportation facilities to the
land and cityscape. 19
These specific objectives reflected the more general objectives of a
balanced transportation system, such as alleviating traffic congestion, reducing travel times and accident exposure, and minimizing costs and disruptive effects upon communities and natural resources.2 °
These alternative plans were presented for public review and evaluation during the last half of 1966.21 More specifically, the seven constituent County Boards, the State Highway Commission of Wisconsin, the
Streets and Zoning Committee of the Common Council of the City of
Milwaukee, the Milwaukee County Expressway and Park Commissions,
and the City of Milwaukee Planning Commissions considered the three
alternative land use and transportation plans.' Additionally, a public
hearing was held on October 26, 1966, at which nearly 600 interested
municipal officials, citizens, and public leaders attended and
participated.5
The reviewing agencies favored adopting the Controlled Existing
Trend Land Use Plan alternative as the final regional land use plan.24
The elected public officials within the region also reacted favorably to
the adoption of this plan, reinforcing the technical evaluation of the alternative plans. 25 Bolstered by this public support, the Commission
adopted the First Generation Land Use-Transportation Plan by a unanimous vote at its regular quarterly meeting on December 1, 1966. At the
19. SOUTnAMSTRN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N., 2 LAND USE AND
STUDY: FoREcAsTs AND ALTERNATIVE PLANS 1990, at 10 (June,
1966)[hereinafter SEWRPC, FORECASTS AND ALTERNATIVE PLANS].
TRANSPORTATION

20. Id. at 9. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to spell out the various alternatives that were considered, it is sufficient to say that the transportation plan (essentially the
same system of freeways) would have been required to serve the region under each of the land
use plans (Controlled Existing Trend Plan, Corridor Plan, and Satellite Plan). Although the
required capacity of the standard arterial street and highway system differ, the Satellite City
Plan would have required the greatest investment for additional highway capacity by 1990.
The eight new freeways, proposed under each of the alternative land use plans, totaled approximately 256 miles in length.
21. George C. Berteau, Statement of the Chairman, SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, 3 LAND UsE-TRANSPORTATION STUDY: RECOMMENDED
GIONAL LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION PLANS 1990 (Nov., 1966).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. SOUTHEASTERN

RE-

WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, 3 LAND UsE-TRANSPORTATION STUDY: RECOMMENDED REGIONAL LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION PLANS 1990, at

2 (Nov., 1966)[hereinafter SEWRPC, RECOMMENDED PLANS].
25. Id. at 17.
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same time, it set forth specific recommendations concerning implementation of the recommended plan.
The First Generation Regional Land Use-Transportation Plan,
adopted by SEWRPC, consisted of the Controlled Existing Trend Land
Use Plan (modified in several minor ways) and a transportation plan.
The transportation plan was designed to
achieve a balance between transportation modes; that is, between
the provision and utilization of highway and transit facilities, as
well as a balance between traffic loads, system capacities and service levels. Its design was dictated by existing and committed
transportation facilities, by transportation system development
objectives and standards to be met, by consideration of system
integration and continuity needs, and by attendant benefits and
costs, as well as by the pattern of land use and travel demand to
be served.26
The transportation plan recommended the following freeway improvements (in addition to "built" or "committed" freeways):
1. Extension of the Lake Freeway from the proposed high level
bridge across the entrance of the Milwaukee harbor southerly
through Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha counties to the state
line, connecting there with a freeway proposed by the State of
Illinois.
2. Extension of the Stadium Freeway northerly to the regional
boundary in Ozaukee County.
3. Extension of the North-South Freeway northerly to the regional boundary in Ozaukee County.
4. Construction of the Bay Freeway in Milwaukee and Waukesha Counties.
5. Construction of the Milwaukee River Parkway in Milwaukee
County.
6. Construction of the Milwaukee Metropolitan Belt Freeway in
Milwaukee, Waukesha, and Washington Counties.
7. Construction of the West Bend Freeway in Washington
County.
8. Completion of the Rock Freeway to the regional boundary at
Rock County.
9. Construction of the Racine Loop Freeway in Racine
County.27
Most of these facilities were never built because a number of freeways that were designated as being "committed to construction" by local
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 25-26.

1995]

POLITICS OF CONGESTION AND IMPLEMENTATION

683

and state authorities were, in fact, never started or completed. These
include the Stadium Freeway-South, Stadium Freeway-North, Park Freeway-West,' Park Freeway-East, and the Lake Freeway-South. 2 9 These
freeways had to be constructed to provide the necessary linkages and
continuities to justify the nine freeways listed above.30
In addition, the Planrecommended construction of a greatly expanded
rapidtransitsystem which would provide the most heavily urbanizedportions of the region with an efficient and economical, as well as a high level
of, transitservice.3 This fact was conveniently forgotten by opponents of
freeway construction over the following ten years.
The First Generation Regional Land Use-Transportation Plan was
eventually adopted and approved by all governmental authorities at the
local and state levels, representing for planning purposes the development of Southeastern Wisconsin until the year 1990.
After adoption of this plan, several events occurred that sounded the
death knell for further freeway construction:
1. In 1971, Governor Patrick Lucy appointed the "Currie Commission," which investigated the State Highway Commission's
land acquisition policies and found that the Commission was apparently exceeding its authority in buying land in advance of the
need for particular freeways and other highways, and before the
required Environmental Impact Statements had been completed
and approved. As a result of this criticism, the State Highway
Commission directed that no more lands be purchased for these
freeways effectively bringing plan implementation to a halt. This
created unrest and difficulty at the local level with the continued
preservation of rights-of-way for proposed facilities.32
2. In 1971, Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier and Milwaukee
County Executive John Doyne joined with Governor Lucy to put
a moratorium on all freeway development in Milwaukee County
on the grounds that too many homes had been taken off the City
of Milwaukee tax rolls. In the latter part of 1973, and early 1974,
28. For a primitive example of community opposition to this freeway project, see WEsr
THE PARK WEsT AND WHAT rr MEANS TO Us (Jan. 1973).
29. For a complete map of the proposed freeway system (including existing, committed,
and proposed additions) for the design year 1990; see SEWRPC, RECOMMENDED PLANS,
supra note 24, at 28.
30. Appendix A contains a chart detailing these proposed facilities and their inclusion or
exclusion from the First and Second Generation Regional Transportation Land Use Plans, as
well as their ultimate fate in terms of plan implementation.
31. ML at 35-36, 41.
SIE CrnZENS COALrION,

32. SEWRPC, MINuTES, supra note 6, at 4.
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there were requests that this moratorium cease and that freeway
development be reinstituted along the lines of the regional plan.33
3. The City of Milwaukee continued to ignore a Milwaukee
County Committee Board Resolution, which asked the City to reinstate freeway development and to oppose stage four of the
North Lakes development, on the grounds that construction
would be detrimental to the eventual construction of the Stadium
Freeway-North. The Ozaukee County Board adopted a resolution supporting the Milwaukee County Board on this issue.'
4. Milwaukee County Board Executive John Doyne recanted his
position about the "Gap Closure" freeway (the link between the
Stadium Freeway-North and the Fond du Lac Freeway) and indicated that he would
not be opposed to the "Gap Closure" prior to
35
leaving office.
5. A group of young Milwaukee area state legislators, including
Mordecai Lee, James Moody, and future Milwaukee Mayor John
Norquist, worked in Madison to block construction of the balance
of the planned system and ultimately for the demapping of the
remaining segments. Legislation was eventually passed prohibiting: construction of a freeway along the Hampton Avenue corridor in Milwaukee .County, construction of additional freeway
lanes on Interstate 43 north of downtown Milwaukee, and expansion of Fond du Lac Avenue between the Hillside
Interchange
36
and North 35th Street in the City of Milwaukee.
III.

Ti-

MiLWAUKEE CouNTY ExPREsswAY REFERENDUMS

In sharp contrast to these legislative activities, on November 5, 1974,
five Milwaukee County expressway referendums were passed, approving
construction of the remaining planned freeways in Milwaukee County.
These referendums involved construction of the Stadium and Park Freeways, the Lake Freeway-South to Layton Avenue, and the Airport Spur
Freeway. In total, seventeen miles of freeways were approved by the
electorate.37 The results of the referendums were as follows, with bold
print indicating the dominant vote:
County Referendum Number 1: "Shall the Milwaukee County
Expressway system be extended by constructing a connection be33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 30-31.
Id.
Id.
Wis. STAT. § 84.295(3) (1971).

37. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NINTH REGIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE, 35 (Apr. 14, 1976)[hereinafter SEWRPC, NINTH
REGIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE].
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tween General Mitchell Airport and the North-South Expressway

(1-94)?"
Yes
No

115,636
83,131

58%
42%

198,767
100%
County Referendum Number 2: "Shall the Park Expressway be constructed from the North-South Expressway (Route 141) westerly to 60th
and Burleigh?"
Yes
105,748
54%
No
89,412
46%
195,160
100%
County Referendum Number 3: "Shall the Stadium Freeway be constructed from National Avenue southerly to the Airport Expressway (I894)?"
Yes
116,083
59%
No
79,281
41%
195,364
100%
County Referendum Number 4: "Shall the Lake Expressway loop be
constructed from the north end of the Harbor Bridge at Michigan St.
northerly and westerly to a connection with the existing Park
Expressway?"
Yes
113,790
58%
No
81,861
42%
195,651
100%
County Referendum Number 5: "Shall the Lake Expressway be constructed from the south end of the Harbor Bridge on Jones Island southerly to Layton Avenue?"
Yes
114,602
59%
No
80,770
41%
100%38
195,372
Referendums 1, 3, 4 and 5 received the greatest percentage of votes
in favor of freeway expansion. Only the Park-West and Stadium-North
project revealed a serious division of opinion. It should be noted that
only Referendum Number 1, the Airport Spur Freeway, was taken forward to construction. Further examination of these results indicates that
the margin of victory was greater in the Milwaukee County suburbs than
38. MILWAUKEE CoUNTY BOARD
NOVEMBER 1974, at 207-213 (1974).

OF

ELECTION

COMMISSIONERS,

SEPTEMBER-
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in the City of Milwaukee. 9 However, there is not one single instance
where the residents of the City of Milwaukee definitively rejected the
construction of any proposed freeway segments, even in those areas
where construction would take place.40 Significantly, predominantly minority districts in the City favored construction. Despite this clear indication of public will, local and state politicians failed to pass the
necessary legislation authorizing construction of these segments. This
raises an important issue of democratic accountability to the electorate.
Why didn't elected officials, including State Representative Norquist,
take the legislative steps to implement this clear indication of public
will?
These referendum votes, though twenty years old, are supported by
the recent referendums on light rail and freeway construction in the Milwaukee area. In the spring of 1994, the electorate of West Allis, Wisconsin voted against the light rail plan for their city. 4 In November of 1994,
light rail referendums were also voted down in Waukesha County, and
the cities of Bayside and Whitefish Bay.42 Equally significant, however,
was the fact that the voters of Waukesha County approved an advisory
referendum supporting the construction of an expanded freeway and
roadway system for Southeastern Wisconsin and stronger land use controls to guide urban development and its associated expansion of the
transportation system.43
Given the historical and present opinion of some portions of the electorate, that freeway construction is necessary and desirable for the region, the late Mayor of Milwaukee, Henry Maier, was erroneous in
asserting that the people of Milwaukee did not want continued construction of freeways. Furthermore, a referendum on renewed freeway construction in Milwaukee County should be presented to the electorate.
Given the current debate in Milwaukee regarding the desirability of
placing the light rail plan before the electorate via referendum, it is clear
that those elected officials who oppose placing light rail and freeway
questions before the electorate through referendum are afraid that the
electorate may reject the light rail plan and may, like in November 1974,
approve plans for additional freeway construction. These referendum
39. Id.
40. Id.

41. Lisa Sink and Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Transit ProposalsRejected in Area, Muw. SEmnNov. 9, 1994, at 8A.
42. Id.
43. I&

NEL,
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results complicate the debate on future transportation improvements,
whether light rail supporters admit it or not.
IV. THE SECOND GENERATION LAND-UsE TRANSPORTATION PLAN
Development and planning for the Second Generation Regional
Land Use-Transportation Plan began in 1976, with a year 2000 implementation date.' SEWRPC initially recommended a two-tier system of
development for various uncompleted segments of the freeway system.
Under the proposed system, the Stadium-South, Lake-South, and Airport Spurs would be completed within ten years, and completion of the
Park-East, Stadium-North, and Park-West would take place if conditions
warranted such construction over the next twenty years. 45
The preliminary recommended transportation plan was taken to four
well-attended public hearings held throughout the region by the Commission 46 "The public hearing held for Milwaukee and Waukesha
Counties indicated both widespread support for and widespread opposition to completion of the Milwaukee County freeway system, providing
further evidence of the very significant and very deep division of public
opinion within those counties as to the desirability of completing the
freeway system as originally planned."4 7 The most significant opposition
to freeway construction was directed against the combination Park Freeway-West and Stadium Freeway-North "gap closure" project, although
this project had a significant amount of support as well.48 However, this
"opposition" should be read in context of the November 1974 referenda.
With the exception of the Milwaukee County Expressway and Transportation Commission, there was little support by either freeway supporters
or opponents for the preliminary Commission recommendation to place
the Park Freeway-West and Stadium Freeway-North "gap closure" in the
upper tier of the plan, thus reserving the cleared right-of-way for the
Park Freeway-West in open space uses for at least a decade.49 The Com-

44. See generally SEWRPC, MNTES, supra note 6.
45. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, 2 A REGIONAL LAND
USE PLAN AND

A

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN-2000:

ALTERNATIVE AND RECOMMENDED PLANS 538-39 (1978) [hereinafter SEWRPC, ALTERNATwE AND RECOMMENDED PLANS].

46. Id.at 614.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
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mission met on December 19, 1977, to deliberate on the public reaction
to the preliminary recommended regional transportation plan.50
After considerable discussion and debate, the Commission directed
the staff to prepare a final recommended plan that would include all the
uncompleted Milwaukee County freeways, and that a study be made of
the impacts on the regional freeway and surface arterial system if the
Stadium Freeway-North "gap closure" project was removed from the
plan."' On December 28, 1977, the Commission met and received a
communication from the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of
Transportation indicating that state and federal funds for the StadiumNorth Freeway study, called for by the Commission on December 19,
1977, would likely not be available.5 After receiving this information
and after further debate and discussion, the Commission directed that
the Park-West and Stadium-North Freeways be removed entirely from
the new long range plan. 3 The Commission directed that a study be
conducted on the best way to meet the transportation needs of the
northwest quadrant of the Milwaukee area in the absence of these two
freeways.5 4 Because of the efforts of local and State elected officials in
Madison, all freeway segments were eventually demapped through
amendments to the Second Generation Plan, thereby allowing public
and private development. There has been no significant transportation
improvements to the northwest side of Milwaukee since the demapping
of the Stadium-North and Park-West freeways, seventeen years ago.
The Second Generation Plan reflected the changing demographics,
population, and job shifts, as well as the public reaction to implementation efforts. This plan implicitly recognized that continued freeway development was not feasible due to political and fiscal developments,
although SEWRPC continued to project that sufficient funds would be
available at the state and federal levels for construction.5 5 In the Second
Generation Plan, emphasis was placed on transit improvements, traffic
management systems, and some arterial improvements to the existing
plan.56 The Plan provided for "completion" of the remaining freeway
segments by either converting them to arterial status or integrating them
into the existing road system.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

IL
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Berteau, supra note 21.
Id.
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All freeway lands that had been cleared or reserved for right-of-way
were disposed of by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation or Milwaukee County. The Lake Freeway-South, which was planned for the
past twenty-five years, is currently being built by the State of Wisconsin
as the Lake Arterial, a four lane arterial which will not have the same
capacity as the Lake Freeway. The Lake Arterial is the first new project
to be initiated in Milwaukee County since the mid-1970s. Sadly, however, it was recently announced that the Lake Arterial Project will be
completed two years later than projected due to ground pollution existing within some of the right-of-way that was purchased by the State of
Wisconsin. As a result, the first mile of the north-bound segment will be
one lane in width. The Lake Arterial will be at best a marginal improvement to the region's transportation network, a project that will cost in
excess of $90 million dollars.5 7

Because all remaining freeway segments were demapped, SEWRPC
recommended in the Second Generation Plan that certain arterials in
Milwaukee County be widened to carry the traffic that would have been
carried on the proposed but now eliminated freeways. As a 1990 interim
report by SEWRPC reported, only twenty percent of the work recommended has been completed, although the region was over sixty percent
into the planning period.5" Furthermore, the Lake Arterial project was
recommended for construction through Milwaukee and Racine Counties, a distance of approximately twenty-one miles. 59 Extension of the
Lake Arterial, from Layton Avenue in Milwaukee to Kenosha, was deleted by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation in 1993, due to
opposition by one-hundred property owners adjacent to the project and
the City of Oak Creek and Town of Caledonia.6" The Second Generation Plan, therefore, stands for two principles: (1) poor transportation
planning and implementation; and (2) political compromise. The region
is not better off under this plan.
In 1990, the SEWIRPC began a re-evaluation of the adopted Second
Generation Land Use-Transportation Plan. The Commission has found
57. Given this situation, one can question whether the Lake Arterial should be built in its
present configuration.
58. SEWRPC to ReevaluateRegional Land Use and TransportationPlans,SOUtHmASTERN
WiSCONSIN REGioNAL PLANNG COMM'N NEWSLETMR, (Waukesha, WI), May-June, 1990, at
47 [hereinafter SEWRPC NEwsrETrERj.
59. Id.

60. Letter from Gary R Weihler, Director, Transportation Division, Milwaukee County

Department of Public Works and Development to James J. Casey, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file
with author).
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that while the land use plan was implemented, several trends surfaced
which are at variance with the plan.61 These include:
1. Approximately twenty percent of all housing units constructed between 1970 and 1985 have been developed beyond the
urban growth pattern areas recommended in the plan in a highly
diffused, low-density pattern, with onsite sewage disposal and
water supply facilities.
2. A number of significant commercial and industrial centers
were developed within Southeastern Wisconsin between 1970 and
1985 which were not envisioned under the plan. This occurred
particularly along freeway corridors and selected freeway
interchanges.
3. Approximately thirty-one percent of the 468 square miles of
primary environmental corridor lands in Southeastern Wisconsin
were not adequately protected.
4. Approximately forty-four percent of the 1,047 square miles of
prime agricultural land in the Southeastern Wisconsin region was
not protected from suburban development.
5. The distribution of employment by county within the Southeastern Wisconsin region between 1970 and 1985 has generally
not occurred in conformance with the adopted regional land use
plan, which recommended the stabilization and revitalization of
the existing urban centers and the location of new development in
concentric rings outward from these centers. 62
These trends have, along with other practices, increased the automobile as the vehicle of choice in the region. Addressing implementation of
the Transportation Plan, the Commission summarized the following:
1. The recommended expansion and improvement of the regional public transit system has not been implemented.
2. The travel demand management measures recommended in
the adopted regional transportation plan to reduce vehicular
travel have not been fully implemented.
3. Household and employment growth in the region have occurred largely as forecast over the past two decades, and the distribution of that growth within the region has also occurred
largely as planned. Due to the lack of implementation of the recommended transit improvement and travel demand measures,
highway traffic in Southeastern Wisconsin from 1972 to 1988 increased substantially faster than envisioned in the Plan-at an av61. SEWRPC NEWSLEI-rER, supra note 58, at 20-21.
62. Id. at 20-21.
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erage annual rate of about 2.7% as compared to the envisioned
rate of 1.5%.
4. The growth in traffic on the area freeway system over the period 1972 to 1988 has been particularly rapid-a rate of about
3.7% per year as measured by vehicle miles travelled per average
weekday. This may be attributed not only to the lack of implementation of recommended transit and travel demand management measures, but also to the limited implementation of
important surface arterial improvements recommended in the regional transportation plan. A contributing factor is the continuation of some land use trends which are at variance with the
adopted regional land use plan, including continuing low-density
sprawl-type development in the outlying portions of the Region
and the emergence of unplanned commercial centers in freeway
corridors. As a63result, the level of freeway congestion has increased rapidly.
The Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission has
summarized its overall findings as follows:
1. Vith respect to the assumed levels of overall regional growth
incorporated into the adopted regional land use plan and which
provided an important basis for the design of the transportation
plan, the plans, now twelve years old, remain valid.
2. Over the past two decades, actual land use growth and change
within the region have occurred in relatively close conformance
with the adopted regional land use plan, although certain trends
have been at variance with those envisioned in the plan.
3. Approximately seventy-five percent of the 468 square miles
of primary environmental corridor in the region have been protected from urban encroachment. Twenty-five percent remains to
be protected.
4. Approximately fifty-six percent of the 1,047 square miles of
prime agricultural land in the region has been protected from urban encroachment. Forty-four percent remains to be protected.
5. The ambitious program of public transit improvement and expansion has not been implemented.
6. The plan envisioned a doubling of the 1972 transit ridership
levels through this improvement and expansion of transit service
by the year 2000. However, ridership levels remain the same as in
1972, as very little implementation of the planned expansion and
improvement of public transit service has actually occurred.
7. There has been little implementation of the travel demand
management measures to reduce and discourage vehicular travel.
63. Id at 39-43.
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8. Of the 582 miles of arterial street widenings and new arterial
streets identified in the adopted regional transportation plan, only
130 miles, or twenty-two percent, have been completed as of
1990. Yet the region is over sixty percent into the planningperiod.
Many important arterial streets intended to provide alternatives
resito the demapped freeway system for Southeastern Wisconsin
64
dents, business, and industry have not been implemented.
In light of the implementation of the Second Generation Transportation Plan, there will be a need to re-examine the public transit and travel
demand management elements of the plan, which to date have not been
substantially implemented.65 The trends in arterial traffic and attendant
congestion may also necessitate revisions in the arterial street and highway system plan. There is a continued need for major improvement of
arterial streets and perhaps to some freeways. Particularconsideration
needs to be given to the widening of certain freeways, the provision of
some new freeway interchanges, and the reconfiguration of other interchanges and relatedfrontage roads.6 6
Conclusions to be drawn from the Second Generation Plan are the
following:
1. The decisions to demap all proposed freeways in the Milwaukee area reversed two decades of decisionmaking at the local and
regional levels, and vitiated the spending of millions of dollars on
right-of-way acquisition, clearance, and reservation.
2. The decision to sell and dispose of all acquired rights-of-way
not only limits current policymaking paradigms to solve the transportation problem in the region by reducing the amount of alternatives available, but will make future right-of-way acquisition far
more expensive. 67 The decision to dispose of all rights-of-way for
freeway and transit development represented short-sighted and
irresponsible policymaking. Now that the lands have been disposed of, there are no alternatives for policymakers, short of repurchasing the lands.
3. The improvements in the plan regarding transit and traffic
management have not been implemented. This has not lessened
the amount of traffic on the regional freeway system. Milwaukee
County is currently installing some signalized meters on the free64. Id at 45-48.

65. Id at 48.
66. Id.

67. During the Second Generation deliberations, some SEWRPC members wanted the
freeway lands, particularly in the Park-West corridor, reserved for an additional ten years.
Supporters and opponents of freeways disregarded this option. SEWRPC, ALTERNATIVE
AND RECOMMENDED PLAs, supra note 45, at 614.
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way ramps to regulate the flow of traffic, but one has to wonder
whether this is too little, too late, to reverse the reliance on the
freeway system.
4. The recommended improvements to the arterial roadway system have only been partially implemented, approximately twenty
percent. It is irresponsible policymaking to support demapping of
the freeway system with the promise to expand the arterial network, and then fail to implement this expansion.68
The demapping of the remaining freeway segments has some of its
genesis in social and political conflict. The City of Milwaukee, first by
Mayor Maier and now by Mayor Norquist, has always blamed freeways
for its shrinking population and jobs base. What the City has failed to
realize is that the process of urban sprawl has its roots in many economic
and social causes, a point supported by the Executive Director of
SEWRPC. 69 The question, then, becomes: But for the development of
the freeway system, would the City of Milwaukee have lost population
and jobs? The answer is clearly "yes." The City of Milwaukee, if it was
a truly progressive city, could have used freeway development as a powerful economic development tool, using freeways as a powerful engine to
recruit companies and jobs. The City has used the freeway system as an
incentive to lure jobs back to the City, and in grant proposals has described freeways as assets to bringing jobs back to the City.
SEWRPC, in its 1990 interim report, stated that most of the industrial and service sector jobs created in the Milwaukee area over the past
twenty years occurred along freeway corridors. The Park-West could
have been developed as an efficient freeway segment that would bring
jobs and people back into the west central sector of the City. While
there has been development in this corridor, much of this corridor remains vacant. 70 Are private investors telling the City that this area is not
worth investing in? Development in the Park-West corridor has been
piecemeal in nature and does not represent nearly the potential of the
area. Mayor Henry Maier's failure to support the construction of the
68. The Second Generation Plan recommended that parking spaces in the Milwaukee
Central Business District be limited. I& at 660. Since becoming Mayor, John Norquist has
supported redevelopment projects involving an increase in the number of parking spaces in
the Milwaukee Central Business District (CBD). In essence, he has supported the increase in
the number of automobiles in the downtown Milwaukee area, a position contrary to his beliefs
regarding transit and light rail.
69. Letter from Kurt W. Bauer, Executive Director of SEWRPC to James J. Casey, Jr. 2
(Oct. 28, 1993) (on file with author).

70. Letter from Orson C. Porter, Staff Assistant to Milwaukee Mayor John 0. Norquist to
James J. Casey, Jr. (Jan. 31, 1994) (on file with author).
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Park-West Freeway, after supporting the razing of homes and commercial enterprises in this corridor, and his failure to redevelop the corridor
after it was demapped, are two of his significant urban failures. The
Park-West corridor remains, to this day, a daily reminder of poor urban
policy planning and implementation. The City, and the entire region,
would be far better off if the Park-West Freeway had been constructed.
The City of Milwaukee, before it advocated the demapping of the
freeways, should have proposed realistic development opportunities for
those lands in the absence of the freeways. The Park-West Freeway corridor is clear evidence that City politicians were opposed to the freeway,
yet provided no evidence to the community at large that those lands
were more deserving of other uses. It should be noted that several other
segments have been developed more extensively, namely the Park-East
and Stadium-South, raising the question of why business will not invest
in the Park-West corridor.
It has been stated that the question of freeway development and the
disposal of lands for uncompleted segments are irrelevant questions,
given the events that have transpired in the last twenty years, namely the
disposition of lands and the continued public opposition to freeway development.7 This issue is not irrelevant because it questions whether
these decisions were the wise ones for the region over the next thirty
years. The fact that the Milwaukee County electorate in November 1974
approved completion of the Milwaukee County freeway system suggests
that much latent support may still exist. Officials from WISDOT and
SEWRPC were asked about this referendum vote and the failure of local
and state politicians to follow through on this vote to authorize construction. They simply responded that local elected officials did not support
freeway construction.72 A question of democracy may be rightfully
asked in this situation, namely, how come elected officials did not do
what the people directed? This question is asked everyday in governmental affairs, and is rightfully asked in this situation.73
It appears that the best way to answer the question of additional freeway construction is to put the question before the Milwaukee County
electorate. It is doubtful, however, that Mayor Norquist would support
71. Letter from Kurt W. Bauer, supra note 69, at 1-2.
72. Letter from Thomas A. Winkle, P.E., District Chief Transportation Assistance and
Planning Engineer, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, to James J. Casey, Jr. (Feb. 2,
1994)(on file with author).
73. See SEWRPC, NINTH REGIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE, supra note 37 at 95 (comments of Mr. Dick Butula, City of Milwaukee).
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such a referendum, since he does not even support a referendum on light
rail at this point in time.
An examination of the history of freeway development in Milwaukee
is relevant to the current light rail proposal, not only to draw historical
parallels, but to question the merit of the light rail proposal. Will the
light rail system provide the needed transportation service in the region
and will it make sense to invest in it from a cost-benefit standpoint? Will
the transit proposals provide the needed service to the region? Can the
transit proposals be implemented without neighborhood disruption?
What about the "third leg" of the region's transportation network, i.e.,
the arterial and highway systems? Should money be invested in its expansion? These are all questions that need to be raised in the public
discourse on the current light rail proposal. The question of freeway expansion is not being considered, despite the fact that the bulk of the
people and commerce are transported on the freeway and highway system. Elected officials must consider all means to improve the regional
transportation system, and so far have failed to do so.
The history of freeway development in the Milwaukee area indicates
that public support for construction of freeways was strong during the
period of actual construction, roughly the years 1958 through 1968. After 1968, support for freeway development declined, although it still constituted a majority of Milwaukee County residents, as evidenced by the
1974 referendum.74 This decline coincided with the rise in opposition to
freeway development, primarily concentratedwithin the City of Milwaukee. In opposing freeway development, the City did not present a credible alternative. The stalemate between pro- and anti-freeway forces led
to the stalemate and ultimate demapping of freeway proposals that had
been standing since the late 1950s. In the aftermath of this demapping,
recommended alternatives to the regional freeway system have not been
fully implemented. This historical stalemate and dismal failure of plan
implementation has backed Southeastern Wisconsin into a corner from
which no easy exit is possible. This also places the region in the current
political climate and in the context of the light rail and transit proposal,
which is heavily supported and advocated by the Mayor of Milwaukee, a
prominent freeway opponent. This historical summary will now be
placed within the context of policy implementation.

74. See supra Part III.
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THE REGION'S FREEWAY SYSTEM

The implementation of the region's freeway system will be measured
against the policymaking paradigm that is presented by Robert J. Waste
in The Ecology of City Policymaking."1 In his book, Professor Waste
argues that despite the vast differences in American cities (region, location, size, and age), all U.S. cities are similar in two important aspects:
(1) public policy is enacted in the same way, and goes through the same
"life cycle" in every American city; and (2) all cities share a policymaking environment or "policy ecology," comprising of ten key elements:
1. age;
2. locale;
3. the growth process and rate of growth;
4. the local political culture;
5. the personality of key elected and appointed policymakers in the
city;
6. the presence or absence of political scandals or reform efforts;
7. the types of policy conflict that occur in American cities;
8. the types of policies enacted in American cities;
9. the presence and strength of regulatory activity in the city; and
10. exogenous factors subsumed under the heading "intergovernmental
'76
relations.
While the mix of these ten elements will vary greatly from city to city,
the basic process of local policymaking follows the same pattern, or "life
cycle."' 77 Using the policy life cycle model and the ten-part policy ecology of cities to explain policymaking in American cities, Professor Waste
argues that policymaking is best viewed as a result of the policy cycle of a
city interacting with, and affected by, ten internal and external variables
in accordance with routinized laws that govern the behavior of local governmental bodies and assign advantages and disadvantages to various
players and policy alternatives. 78 He suggests that, "[c]ity policy is not
caused or determined but is greatly influenced by ten identifiable ecological factors that affect the policy life cycle in differing degrees in all
American cities."' 79 The life cycle model is presented as a way of better
75. ROBERT J.WASTE, THE ECOLOGY OF CrIY POLICYMAKING (1989).

76. Id. at 3-4.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. The notion of a "policy ecology" that shapes and determines public choices in a
local arena is an extension of arguments that (1) politics and policy are shaped by the environment in which they occur, i.e., they cannot be isolated from it, and (2) that political structures
have a filtering effect, i.e., some pressures for governmental action are responded to, and
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understanding and explaining policy. For this Article, the model explains why the freeway system was not constructed as originally planned,
and helps predict what may happen with the proposed light rail system
and any future transportation improvements.
A.

Description of Local Policy Ecological Factors

The age, growth process, and locale factors account for many
variations in city policymaking. Included in these dimensions of
city policymaking are the effects of zealots and voluntarism, the
density and spatial location of the city, the differences between
councils that tend toward one of four main orientations (economic boosters, amenity providers, caretakers, or arbiters), and
the impact of geographic regionalism upon local policymaking.8 0
The policy types andpolicy conflict level factors provide a way of understanding and anticipating the general pattern of political conflict associated with policymaking in American cities, as well as a way to
explain deviations from the general pattern in local policymaking.81
Waste agrees with other prominent scholars who argue that issues determine politics.81 This viewpoint may be especially pertinent with regards
to the current issue of light rail and transit reform. All political discussions on reducing congestion on the greater Milwaukee freeway system
revolve around using light rail, transit reform, and demand management
systems to reduce congestion. This is entirely reasonable, except that
engineers for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation have explicother are not. Therefore, political structures help determine both whether a demand elicits a
response and the nature of the response itself. CLARENCE N. STONE Er. AL., URBAN POLICY
AND PoLTIcs IN A BUREAUCRATIC AGE 175 (1986). As the authors aptly state: "It is difficult
to talk causally about politics, policy, and environment for several reasons. First, not only
does the environment give birth to pressures for government action but it also shapes the
political structures through which a community responds to pressures. Changes in the environment can bring about changes in a community's political structures. Second, pressures for
action do not arise simply and directly from the local community environment (the social,
economic, and cultural characteristics) of particular communities. Pressures for action are
partially a response to world and national events, the larger climate of opinion, the intervention and actions of the national government, major corporations, and other transcommunity
forces. Thus, larger events activate segments of the population, as when politically quiescent
black communities became active and assertive." Id. (emphasis added). The authors recognize that public policy choices do not occur within a vacuum; rather, they effect and are affected by forces within and outside the community. This certainly applies to the current topic
under discussion, as the Article discusses various issues that impact upon the politics of
congestion.
80. WASrE, supra note 75, at 8.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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itly said that these measures, by themselves, will not reduce congestion
in the Milwaukee area. By ignoring additional freeway construction and
expansion, Milwaukee-area elected officials have limited the scope of
the regional debate. One may ask, "Is this responsible policymaking?"
The reform, regulatory activity and external factors.., are key
components in the ecology of the city policymaking process, interfering in the policymaking life cycle at irregular intervals as they
ebb and flow, at times affecting the operations of the local policy
life cycle greatly, and at other times affecting it very little.
The Clean Air Act and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act85 are significant external factors that have a significant bearing on current transportation developments in the Milwaukee area.
These two federal statutes are considered later in this article.
B.

The "Policy Ecology" of the Milwaukee Area

Applying the "policy ecology" paradigm as outlined by Robert
Waste, the "policy ecology" of the Milwaukee area can be outlined as
follows:
1. Age. Milwaukee is a fairly old city by American standards, having been first settled around the year 1800. The age of the City is important because it reflects a traditional European (primarily Germanic)
heritage, and reflects the fairly dense housing patterns within the City.
The density of the housing is apparent from the discussions on freeway
development; it has been claimed that the City of Milwaukee lost 10,000
homes to the freeways that are currently on the map.86 Furthermore, the
approximately five miles of the Stadium Freeway-North would have required the taking of another 1,000 homes, a step that the City would not
takeY' The age of the City also is reflected in its housing stock; over fifty
percent of the homes within the City were built before 1940. Given the
age of the City and how this is reflected within the economic, social, and
cultural contexts, it is quite apparent to see why Milwaukee would be
resistant to additional freeway construction.
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
85. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
86. SEWRPC, MmNrs, supra note 6 at 322 (remarks submitted to the SEWRPC by the
Community Relations-Social Development Commission).
87. See itt at 34-35 (comments of Mr. Edwin J. Laszewski, City Engineer for the City of
Milwaukee). In addition to the resident units that would have to be removed, he cited approximately 230 commercial units. Id
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2. Locale. Milwaukee is located on Lake Michigan, eighty-five
miles to the north of Chicago. Being on the lake, like other major midwestern cities, Milwaukee developed a heavy industrial and agricultural
base that was easily exportable to other cities and to the outside world.
This location also gives the City a sense of security, and perhaps has
contributed to the conservative nature of the City's inhabitants. And, as
traffic on the Great Lakes has declined over the years, Milwaukee has
become more dependent upon highway and railway transportation for
commercial purposes.
3. Growth. Between 1850 and 1960, the City of Milwaukee experienced significant growth in terms of both population and commerce.
From a statistical perspective, the population of Milwaukee peaked in
1960 at approximately 741,000 residents. Since that time, with the effects
of urban sprawl, the City lost population on a consistent basis until the
1990 census, which registered approximately 638,000 persons.88 Since
1990, the City has actually gained several thousand residents, indicating
that the "population flight" has been temporarily halted. The City has
blamed the loss of residents and jobs on the freeway system, and used
the dropping population figures in regional meetings in the past.
In terms of economic growth, Milwaukee has traditionally relied on
the heavy industry, food, and beverage industries for its livelihood, with
a small service sector. As a result, Milwaukee was hit hard during the
recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, losing approximately 75,000 industrial
jobs between 1978 and 1983. While its industrial base has stabilized, it
has not increased to its former vigor. The service sector, however, has
provided most of the jobs in the Milwaukee area since the 1970s, reflecting the national pattern. Despite the loss of jobs in the heavy industrial
sector, Milwaukee's overall unemployment rate has remained below the
national average since the Reagan Administration.
4. PoliticalCulture. Milwaukee has a conservative political culture.
The City is very thrifty when it comes to money, running a city with a
budget that is both prudent and conservative. 89 Because of this tendency, the City will rarely raise taxes for any new programs; instead it
88. It has been pointed out, however, that although the City has lost population, there has
been a consistent 2-3% increase in the number of City households during the past 30 years.
Memorandum from David A. Kuemmel, P.E., Marquette University, to James J. Casey, Jr.
(Sept. 18, 1994)(on file with the author). According to Mr. Kuemmel, "[t]he pill and the decline of the American family had just as significant an impact to cause population to decline.
Households are up, but population down. Most people blaming freeways look only at the
population [figures]." Id.
89. The City borrows substantially for its street repair and recycling programs. Id.
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will search for money at the state and federal levels for new programs.
Although never stated explicitly during the freeway deliberations,
money certainly had an impact upon the City's refusal to agree to freeway expansion, because there is no way that the City would not incur
some costs associated with the construction. By way of example, the
City opposed construction of the Stadium-North Freeway because it
would cost the City $25 million in lost revenues. 90 The City has also
opposed freeway construction since 1970 on the basis that enough of the
tax base of the city had been destroyed when homes were razed for the
existing freeways. 91 The Park-East freeway, which Mayor Maier claimed
would add $25 million annually to the downtown economy, was not even
built, proving that the positive economic benefit of freeway construction
is not enough to facilitate construction.
There have been recent discussions of Milwaukee political culture
owing to the August 28, 1994 death of Irwin Maier, retired chairman of
the board of The Journal Company. 92 According to a recent newspaper
article, his death put the "final punctuation mark on a time of privatesector involvement in public affairs in Milwaukee when barons ruled the
earth. 93 This public agenda included building the freeway system.94
Alan Borsuk argues that "[tihat era has given way to a time of more
diffuse power, where coalition building among industrial chiefs plays a
more important role, where civic leaders tend to specialize in the issues
that appeal to them, where decisions are slower in coming but have
broader involvement." 95 Perhaps the most disturbing analysis of this
new environment comes from Mayor Norquist, the political leader of the
City of Milwaukee: "We're kind of in a cycle where there's not an obvious leader."96 It is quite puzzling to see the Mayor of the largest city in
the State of Wisconsin abdicating his inherent power as mayor. Mayor
Norquist should be the leader of the City of Milwaukee, not simply as
part of a coalition of public and private sector officials. If he truly be90. SEWRPC, MnuTES, supra note 6 at 37 (comments of Mr. Patrick H. Mc Laughlin,
Development Coordinator, Mayor's Office, City of Milwaukee).
91. Id. at 30 (comments of Mr. George L. Berteau, Chairman SEWRPC).
92. Alan J. Borsuk, Coalition Builders, Not Power Brokers, Now Shape City, Mjiw. J.,
Sept. 6, 1994, at Al, A6.

93. Id. at Al.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at A6. When asked who had private sector power in Milwaukee, he listed more
than 15 people off the top of his head-in itself a form of acknowledgment of the different
styles and dimensions of civic leaders today. Id
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lieves that he is only part of the policymaking environment, perhaps it is
time to elect a new mayor.
If this is indeed the new environment, then the construction of light
rail and new freeways or both, will be a long and arduous process, with
no certainty that either will be successfully implemented. The question
needs to be asked: Is this environment conducive to resolving the longstanding problems in transportation and other areas?
While principles of democracy seem to demand that people need to
be brought into policymaking, that does not mean that issues are resolved more efficiently and effectively in this manner. Furthermore, the
entry of too many people into the "policymaking process" will bog the
process down. The end result will be endless discussion and no action. It
seems obvious that too much discussion and not enough action took
place with respect to completing the freeway system. The construction
of a new Milwaukee Brewers baseball stadium is a more recent example
of this tendency. How come other cities can propose and build new
baseball stadiums in a shorter period of time? How come other cities
continued to build freeways long after our local and state politicians decided that freeways were a thing of the past? Alan Borsuk's article indicates that most of the people involved in local politics are pleased with
this new environment, as it is in their self-interest to say so. 97 This environment, however, has produced little growth or change over the past
twenty-five years. Political culture in the City of Milwaukee clearly
needs to be shaken from its status quo surroundings.
5. Policy Type. Milwaukee's recent political leaders have tended to
be conservative Democrats, who are "liberal" on social issues and "conservative" on fiscal issues. Despite pronouncements by local elected officials that the entire region needs to work together to solve common
problems, the City has remained steadfast in its belief that it should be
the center of the region; i.e., that all suburbs and their interests should
be subservient to the needs of the City. In the discussions of freeway
development, virtually all opposition came from the City of Milwaukee.
For those segments that spanned several counties, most support would
come from the suburbs and the opposition would come from Milwaukee.
Mayor Maler constantly criticized the suburbs, which did nothing to encourage regional cooperation. This political schism is starting to rear its
ugly head with the light rail proposal. Several Milwaukee and Waukesha

97. Borsuk, supra note 92, at A6.
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County suburbs are starting to voice their opposition to light rail through
official statements and referendums.98
6. PoliticalReform. Milwaukee has been fortunate to avoid major
political scandals. Its government is very reform-oriented and stable.
Within the context of freeway implementation, this ecological factor
would not affect the policymaking in any way.
7. Policy Conflict. Milwaukee experiences, vis-A-vis the suburbs, a
fair amount of policy conflict. The City has sparred with the suburbs on
a handful of policy issues facing the region as a whole. The politics of
freeway implementation is one example of conflict. Another example
was the forced integration by court order of inner city children in the
1970s. Milwaukee County has been in litigation with several Waukesha
County suburbs over the assessment of sewerage charges in the Metropolitan Milwaukee Sewerage District since the early 1980s. Because of
these central policy conflicts, Milwaukee and the outlying suburbs have
been unable to effectively address problems common to the entire region. Milwaukee lost the support of the suburbs in the 1970s when it
decided to block construction of the remaining segments of the freeway
system. That conflict simply carried over into other areas. 99
8. and 9. Policy Enactment and Regulatory Policy. Milwaukee has
tended to be a progressive city when it comes to enacting laws central to
the health and welfare within the city. The City is known for its efforts
in building inspection compliance, as well as for its environmental efforts. In fact, the opposition to the freeway proposals often cited environmental concerns as the basis for opposition, despite the fact that
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) were approved for the remaining freeway segments. What the City experienced, however, in the 1960s
and 1970s was not unique, so in terms of policies enacted and regulatory
policy, it is not clear whether these areas had a substantial amount of
impact on the freeway construction debate.
98. See, e.g., supra Part III.

99. Kathryn C. Bloomberg, Mayor of Brookfield, Wisconsin and Chairwoman of Fair Liquidation of Waste (FLOW), which is the umbrella organization opposing Milwaukee County
in the "sewer wars," recently argued that Milwaukee's inability to compromise with the suburbs on this issue is poisoning other issue areas where city-suburb cooperation is necessary,
including the area of transportation. Kathryn C. Bloomberg, Sewer Wars FLow into All Areas, Muw. J., Aug. 14, 1994, at J1. To quote her directly,
Milwaukee officials have slammed door after door in the face of negotiations, holding
fast and furious to their one rule: Play my way or no way.. . . The City of Milwaukee
has been blinded for so long by its own preoccupation with power and self-importance,
it hasn't taken notice that the area around it has grown and prospered without it.
Id. at J2.

1995]

POLITICS OF CONGESTION AND IMPLEMENTATION

703

10. ExternalFactors. Due to the federalist nature of American government, Milwaukee is subjected to the same exogenous factors that
other American cities are subjected to. The Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990100 and the ISTEA Act of 19911° 1 have significant bearing upon
local transportation issues. Because transportation systems in the
United States have a national component to them, Milwaukee is also
subject to the national pressures of transportation changes. Milwaukee
is taking advantage of the current emphasis upon mass transit and light
rail to propose its own program, as it took advantage of the monies available for freeway development thirty-five years ago. Because Milwaukee
entered the freeway construction era later than other large cities, and
because it terminated construction earlier than some cities, one may
wonder how this has affected the economic development potential of the
City vis-A-vis other American cities. The question then becomes: Will
the City of Milwaukee take proactive or reactive steps towards solving
its congestion crisis?
C. The Life Cycle of City Policymaking
The second aspect of Professor Waste's model is his Policy Life Cycle, which is an amalgam of the "agenda setting" model of Roger Cobb
and Charles Elder, the "policy cycle" model of Bryan Jones, and the
"policy flow" model that Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin have used
with great effectiveness to explain policymaking in Congress and implementation in the federal and state bureaucracies. 1°2 Waste's model is
unique and distinct from the models it draws from, however, because it
distinctly addresses policymaking at the municipal level. °3
The Policy Life Cycle model utilizes the following steps in sequential
order, although local circumstances may dictate a different procedure:
1. The "problem" is articulated by citizens and communitybased organizations. This generally involves discussions of conditions in the community.
2. The "problem" is placed upon the public agenda through
either public discourse or legislative action or both.

100. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
101. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1992)).
102. WASTE, supra note 75, at 29-31. See also RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKIUN, BUREAUCRACY AND POLICY IMPLEMFNTANON (1982), Chs. 1, 4,8; RANDALL B. RniLY
& GRACE A. FRANaIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUmLIC POLICY (1976), Chs. 4,

8.
103. WASTE, supra note 75, at 31.
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3. The "problem" is transformed into a public "issue" by placement upon the public agenda.
4. Local policymakers react to this issue by formulating policy.
This policy may also be reformulated as circumstances dictate.
5. The issue officially becomes part of the municipality's "formal
agenda."
6. The policy is enacted by the legislative body with concurrent
executive action.
7. The policy is implemented.
8. Based upon the impact of the policy in the locality, the policy
is evaluatedin terms of success and failure in addressing the issue.
9. Based upon this impact, the policy may be continued or
terminated 0 4
The policy life cycle also contains a public/private feedback loop that
may impact anywhere in the process, thereby reflecting the full range of
policy refinements that may occur.' 0 5 In theory, then, the policy process
could be sped up or terminated at any point in the process (although
Waste did not provide for this).
The model is also subject to two possible modifications, triggering
mechanisms and containment mechanisms.
[A] triggering mechanism is an action or event that affects a policy problem area and serves as a catalyst for increased public attention and discussion. Containment mechanisms are strategies
or events designed to, or having the effect of, hindering the progress of a policy at the formulation, enactment, implementation,
impact or evaluation, or feedback stages. 0 6
Containment mechanisms include studies, bipartisan panels, or blue
ribbon commissions that are used in an effort to delay a decision, defuse
an issue, or defeat a motion. 07 Like triggering mechanisms, containment mechanisms vary according to scope8 and intensity, and whether
10
they originate within or outside the city.
Not all policymaking takes place on a policy cycle. Policies that exist
off cycle, such as street sweeping and building codes, are off cycle because not very many people are interested in them. 0 9 As will be shown
shortly, the decades of policy debate relating to freeway construction in
the greater Milwaukee area did not occur in an off cycle manner.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id at 31-37.
Id at 37.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 39.
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D. The Policy Life Cycle Model: The Milwaukee Experience
Milwaukee's experience during the freeway construction era fits
rather neatly into the policy life cycle model. The "twists and turns" in
public discussion on this topic illustrates the usefulness of the model.
The model is applied as follows:
1. The "problem." The interstate highway and the federal highway
systems were built to support the national defense structure and provide
a strong national network of urban highways. The construction of such a
system would facilitate commerce in the country and provide a boost to
the economy, which was needed after two quick, successive wars. The
Milwaukee area was no different. As the 1962 inventory of the region's
transportation network illustrated, Milwaukee had severe congestion on
its arterial roadway system. 110 This problem was evident before the passage of the Interstate Highway Act and the later Federal Highway Acts.
It is significant to note that congestion on the Milwaukee arterial system
has been increasing since the decisions to demap the remaining freeway
corridors, particularly in the so-called "northwest corridor" of the City
which would
have been served by the Park-West and Stadium-North
1
Freeways.' '
2. The "publicagenda." Obviously, these needs were met by construction of a national system of freeways, expressways, and highways
that were on the "public agenda" at the federal level beginning in the
late 1940s and continuing full steam into the 1950s. Because it was on
the public agenda, politicians began to treat this as an issue of national
importance.
3. Creation of a "public issue." Based upon its placement on the
national agenda, the issue of an interstate highway system and a system
of supporting freeways, roadway construction became a national issue.
The economic benefits of road construction were clear to politicians in
Washington, D.C.
4. Policy Formulation. Politicians began to treat road construction
as an issue of national importance. In the United States Congress, several bills were introduced in the late 1940s and early 1950s that purported to deal with the issue of road construction. As a further result of
this policy formulation, this issue was formally placed on the agenda of
the U.S. Congress, thus legitimizing the issue of road construction.
110. See generally SEWRPC, INVENTORY FDMINGS, supra note 9.
111. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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5. Policy Enactment. The first national bill to be passed was, of
course, the Interstate Highway System Act of 1956, which mandated the
construction of a 46,000 mile long system of interstate highways that
would eliminate highway congestion, facilitate commerce and economic
development, and provide the national defense structure with a topnotch transportation system. The Federal Highway Act of 1965 was also
instrumental in this time period.
6. Policy Implementation. In the Milwaukee area, construction of
the interstate highway system and a network of supporting freeways began in the late 1950s and was completed, with limited exceptions, by
1970. Certain freeway improvements were completed in the mid-to-late
'70s and the early '80s as part of the decision to demap the remaining
freeway segments. These included arterial improvements in lieu of additional freeway construction and tying the existing freeway segments to
the existing road system. These improvements can best be described as
minimal improvements to the local road system that did little to improve
mobility.
7. Policy Impact. There is no dispute that the construction of the
freeway system in the Southeastern Wisconsin region had a substantial
impact upon the region. Certainly, the construction itself was a boom to
the local economy, as construction companies, laborers, labor unions,
and ancillary industries benefitted from construction. The construction
would provide concrete evidence that the region was dedicated towards
long-term economic development by investing in its infrastructure. The
City of Milwaukee, however, claimed that the impact of the freeways
encouraged "white flight" from the City to the suburbs, which resulted in
a lower tax base due to the loss of homes. As indicated earlier, the City
of Milwaukee has relied upon the freeways too much to explain the exodus of people and jobs from the City. Politicians must own up to the fact
that they share a substantial amount of blame for the "white flight" out
of the City.
8. Policy Evaluation. Based upon the impact that implementation
of the freeway system had in the region, and particularly Milwaukee
County, it is evident that substantial disagreement existed within the region as to the success or failure of the system. This divided evaluation of
the program is what ultimately led to its termination in terms of the remaining segments of the system. This termination, in terms of its ultimate impact upon the overall transportation system in the region, was,
and continues to be, significant. This termination, though not recognized
in the current discussion of the light rail and transit proposal, continues
to color the light rail proposal, especially in terms of possible alternatives
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for the proposal. The potential success or failure of the light rail proposal can be partially measured against this historical backdrop, although
proponents and opponents of the freeway and light rail issues regard
each as mutually exclusive alternatives, a criticalintellectual error."2 In
the minds of local politicians in the region, there is no possibility that
concurrent construction of freeway and light rail segments could take
place. 3
9. The Feedback Loop. It is also quite clear from the discussion of
the history of freeway planning that the feedback loop, as discussed by
Professor Waste, was in action during all phases of the process. Public
opposition on the part of local politicians and citizens began to occur
during the implementation phase of the project. Furthermore, the moratorium on continued freeway development advocated by Governor
Lucy, Mayor Maier, and County Executive John Doyne was significant
because it would embolden local opponents to freeway development and
serve as the first catalyst to the ultimate demapping of the final segments, which by and large were not significant in terms of length. These
freeway segments would have provided the continuity in the system that
is lacking to this date. The continued support and opposition to freeway
development would serve to make the feedback loop a fluid and unpredictable one. This feedback loop would become further ambiguous
when the Milwaukee County electorate approved the construction of the
remaining freeway segments in November 1974.114 As a matter of dem-

ocratic principle, this referendum should have closed the issue once and
for all. As a practical matter, though, the local politicians did not read
this result as being the legitimate voice of the people. The feedback loop
is one of the important characteristics of the policy life cycle as applied
to this issue in the City of Milwaukee.
10. Triggering and Containment Mechanisms. The primary triggering and containment mechanism present in this issue area was the Currie
Commission, which was established by Governor Lucy in 1971. This
commission was established to investigate the land purchasing practices
of the State Highway Commission (SHC) regarding lands for freeway
development. The Commission found that SHC was exceeding its powers by purchasing lands in advance of freeway development before the
environmental impact statements had been completed and approved.
The Commission was directed to cease all purchase of freeway lands for
112. Bauer, supra note 69 at 2.
113. Id.
114. See supra Part M.
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construction, and no lands were purchased after 1971 for these purposes.
This event served both as a triggering mechanism by raising public consciousness of the State Highway Commission's practices and served as a
containment mechanism by halting the purchase of lands for freeway
construction. This event is the first and primary event that led to the
eventual demapping of the freeway segments. This is further evidence
that the model as elucidated by Professor Waste is an accurate one for
describing what occurred in the region concerning freeway construction.
This rather truncated history of the major political events with respect to the freeway system shows that implementation of the freeway
system plan was interrupted by the tumultuous late 1960s as well as the
political opposition of major Milwaukee elected officials to continued
construction. The November 1974 referendum conclusively shows that a
majority of the Milwaukee County electorate favored the completion of
the freeway system. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that overwhelming
public opposition to freeway construction was the sole reason for the
ultimate decisions to demap the remaining freeway segments. The
rather unique decisionmaking process that was involved in this issue can
be further illustrated by the fact that Mayor Maier supported completion
of the Park-East and Lake-North "downtown loop closure," because this
freeway would contribute an additional $25 million per year to the
downtown economy. Despite his support, this freeway corridor was
demapped. The lack of clarity and vision by local politicians regarding
the freeway corridors is disappointing, and one can only hope that they
do not repeat these same mistakes with respect to the light rail and
transit proposal. It is the author's opinion that because of Mayor Maier
and Mayor Norquist's pioneering and comprehensive efforts to promote
a unified transportation network, the Stadium and Park Freeways should
be renamed in their honor.
VI.

FEDERAL LAWS CENTRAL TO THE TRANSPORTATION DEBATE

Another aspect to the issue of transportation planning in the Southeastern Wisconsin region is the impact of two federal statutes upon public discourse: the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA) 115 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.116 These federal statutes are attempts by the U.S. Congress to shape the course of
transportation development in the United States. Ultimately, these statutes are important issues within the context of transportation planning in
115. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
116. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
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the region, particularly with an eye towards reducing transportation congestion. From the standpoint of transportation planning, one must ask
what these statutes allow and what they prohibit. One conclusion to be
drawn from an analysis of these statutes is that neither law prohibits the
construction of additional freeway segments provided that the proposals
meet the environmental safeguards as well as engineering and financial
standards. To suggest, then, that either statute prohibits freeway construction is to misstate the law.
A.

The Intermodal Surface TransportationEfficiency Act of 1991117

In orderto describe in greaterdetailthe Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Bruce E. Cannon, Chief of the Legislation
and Strategic PlanningDivision, United States Departmentof Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, has generously provided the Author with the following information:
This section will describe in general the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), and then discuss priority issues with a concentration on investment needs. Linkages will be made
to specific issues, such as planning requirements of particular interest to
local politicians and planners. Lastly, ISTEA will be considered within
the context of the needs of the Southeastern Wisconsin region.
Before discussing the ISTEA funding and program restructuring, a
description of the Federal-Aid program will provide a framework for
how federal highway funds are used by the states and local communities.
The Federal-Aid Highway Program is a federally-assisted, State-administered program. Federal funds are made available by Congressional formulas to the States and, through the States, to local communities for
maintaining and improving mobility (transportation service) on major
rural and urban highways.
This Federal-State cooperative relationship was defined by the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 and continues today. The State's role was
(and continues to be) to select, plan, design, and construct highway improvements and to maintain and operate the highway system. The Federal responsibility is to promulgate standards, review and approve State
proposals and project actions, ensure compliance with Federal laws, provide technical assistance, distribute Federal funds, and reimburse the
States for prior approved eligible expenditures.
117. This information is excerpted from a memorandum generated internally for FHWA
use and from a paper Bruce E. Cannon presented to the International City Management
Association National Conference in Nashville, Tennessee, September 20, 1993.
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To ensure efficient and effective delivery of the program, the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) has a division office in each State
with delegated responsibility to work with States and, through the States,
with local communities to implement the Federal-Aid Highway Program
in that State. The strengths of the Federal-Aid program are the Federal/
State role definition and associate partnership, and the delegated program responsibility to the FHWA division offices.
Overview of ISTEA. ISTEA 118 expanded the funding and substantially modified the nature of the Federal-Aid Highway Program. This
landmark legislation covers not only highways, but also highway safety
and transit programs, though for this Article, only the highway portion
of ISTEA is discussed. To grasp the impact of this massive and complex
legislation on the operation of the Federal-Aid Highway Program, it is
helpful to look at it from a broad perspective. Funding and program
structure, cross-cutting themes, and eligibility issues emerge from this
broad analysis of ISTEA.
Funding and Restructuring. ISTEA authorizes funds for fiscal years
1992-1997. The total authorized for highway, highway safety, and transit
programs is over $155 billion. This is 50% more on an annual basis than
the amount authorized by the previous multiyear legislation. This
amount reflects a recognition by Congress that we have serious transportation infrastructure needs. The ISTEA provides over $121 billion for
the Federal-Aid Highway Program for these same 6 years. These authorizations average over $20 billion annually.
The funds for the highway portion of the ISTEA are entirely supported by the Highway Trust Fund from fuel taxes and heavy truck user
fees. ISTEA extended the Highway Trust Fund to the end of fiscal year
1999. Most of the Highway Trust Fund revenue comes from taxes of 11.5
cents per gallon on gasoline and 17.5 cents per gallon for highway diesel
fuel. In addition, 2.5 cents per gallon is currently being used for deficit
reduction. On October 1, 1995 the 2.5 cents will be reassigned to the
Highway Trust Fund to ensure that ISTEA funding is adequate through
1997.
ISTEA also extensively restructured the highway program. Congress
provided a clear national focus to the post-Interstate program. Two new
major programs, the National Highway System (NHS) and the Surface
Transportation Program (STP), combine the primary, secondary, safety
construction, and urban programs. The NHS is a new $21 billion pro118. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
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gram for the 6 years of ISTEA. It is the next logical step to the Interstate System. Right now, State and local officials are participating in
defining the NHS. STP is the other major program. With in excess of
$23 billion over 6 years, it is the largest program authorized by ISTEA.
This programgives State and local officials the most flexibility-and more
responsibility-inshaping their transportationfutures. Two major programs, the Interstate and bridge programs, were continued with minor
changes.
Major Themes of ISTEA. The nature of the legislation can be more
clearly appreciated by considering its 10 major themes:
1. Mobility. ISTEA focuses sharply on this Nation's demand and
need for improved access and for safe, comfortable, convenient and economical movement of goods and services. This is exemplified by establishment of a National Highway System identifying the most important
roads to receive special emphasis. Improved access to and choice of
transportation systems is stressed. There is an emphasis on improving
mobility by reducing congestion.
2. Efficiency. A major philosophy underlying the ISTEA is the effective and efficient use of limited resources. This is reflected in the use
of the performance-oriented life cycle cost principles and in six required
management systems. It is also promoted in the assistance given to
States to develop uniform commercial motor vehicle registration and
fuel tax reporting agreements. Efficiency is also encouraged in preserving landfor future transportationfacilities,something which must be done
if transportationis to keep pace with metropolitan area growth.'19
3. Intermodalism. The new program directs those in one mode to
interface with other modes. This intermodalism encompasses highways,
mass transit, water, pipelines, rail and aviation in moving people and
freight. It means that all different modes of transportation must work
together to form a seamless transportation network that will allow people and products to move from one mode to another smoothly, with minimal congestion or interruption.
4. Flexibility. Flexibility means that the State and local communities are the best architects of programs to meet their transportation
needs. They are given choices about the use of Federal funds. The ISTEA broke new ground by allowing large amounts of highway funds to
be used for transit,and vice versa. There are also many options available
in how to spend highway funds. Transportation enhancements, operat119. Are our local elected officials listening?
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ing costs for traffic control management, and seismic retrofit of bridges
are just a few of the items on the expanded list of eligible projects.
5. Innovation. ISTEA sets forth a future-oriented program. Epitomizing this goal is the substantial funding for the development of the
Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems. Domestic and international activities in research, development and technology transfer are significantly
expanded.
6. Environment. The ISTEA emphasizes improvement and enhancement of the environment. New programs-Congestion Mitigation
and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ), Scenic Byways, Congestion
Pricing Pilot program-are established. New uses of funds- transportation enhancements, wetland banking and mitigation of adverse impacts
to wildlife, habitat, and ecosystems-are permitted. And overlaying it all
is a planning process that must consider land use, environmental, and
social effects and must be coordinated with the Water Pollution and
Clean Air Act's plans and programs.
7. Highway Safety. The commitment of the Federal Government to
improve safety on the highways is continued. New initiatives include an
emphasis on work zone safety and a new program encouraging the use of
seat belts and motorcycle helmets.
8. Investment. The ISTEA supports a number of new activities that
are designed to enhance investment and encourage innovative financing
approaches. New cost sharing partnerships are encouraged among the
private sector, State transportation agencies, and revenue enforcement
agencies of both the State and Federal governments.
9. New Partners. The complex mandates of ISTEA demand that
the traditional highway agencies and interests reach beyond their normal
boundaries and create new or enhanced partnerships. An example of
this is a State working in a proactive partnership with air quality agencies, water quality agencies, and the various levels of government.
10. Planning. Finally, there are some changes in transportation
planning. ISTEA strengthens and expands the existing metropolitan
transportation planning processes and establishes a formalized statewide
transportation planning process to effect a lasting change to surface
transportation decisionmaking. Because SEWRPC has been the regional planning authority for Southeastern Wisconsin since 1960, here is
some detail on these expanded planning processes.
The State-Wide Planning Process, which was not required prior to
the ISTEA, is now of major significance. The goal, according to ISTEA,
is: ". . . to encourage .... the development of transportation systems
embracing various modes of transportation in a manner that will serve
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all areas of the State efficiently and effectively." Statewide planning is to
be coordinated with metropolitan area planning and reflect rural economic growth, tourism development, recreational development, and the
concerns of Indian tribal governments with jurisdiction over land in the
State. In developing plans and programs, the State must consider numerous factors identified in the legislation. A few examples are:
e international border crossings and access to ports, airports, intermodal transportation facilities, major freight distribution routes, national parks and scenic areas;
* transportation needs of non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas,
identified through a process that includes consultation with local elected
officials who have jurisdiction over transportation;
* methods to enhance the efficient movement of commercial
vehicles;
* rural economic growth and recreational development; and
* preservationof rights-of-way for construction of future transportation projects.
Out of this process must come a long-range transportation plan covering the entire State, including bicycle transportation and pedestrian
walkways for appropriate areas. The State must also develop a Statewide Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP) that covers all highway
and transit projects funded under Title 23 or under the Federal Transit
Act. The public, and affected public agencies, must be given an opportunity to comment on both the STIP and the long-range plan. STIP must
include a priority listing of projects and it is to include a project only if
full funding can reasonably be anticipated for it within the time proposed for its completion.
For metropolitan areas, ISTEA builds upon the planning process that
began in the early 1960s, but with several changes. Each urbanized area
with a population over 50,000 must have (1) a Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO), if it does not already have one, and (2) a planning
process that covers the metropolitan area. The Governor and the MPO
will determine the metropolitan area boundaries. At a minimum, the
boundaries must include the current urbanized area and the area expected to be urbanized in the next 20 year forecast period. With these
not-yet-urbanized areas included in the MPO planning process, development and infrastructure have a better chance of succeeding.
The MPO's goal, as stated in the ISTEA, is to develop a long-range
plan and a Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) for "transportation systems embracing various modes of transportation to effectively
maximize the mobility of people and goods within and through urban-
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ized areas and minimize transportation related fuel consumption and air
pollution." Each MPO must prepare a TIP, in cooperation with the
State and transit operators. The TIP, which must be updated at last
every 2 years, must include all highway and transit projects proposed for
funding under Title 23 and the Federal Transit Act. The long-range plan
and TIP must be consistent with likely funding levels, and must conform
to the State air quality implementation plan. As part of this process, the
public must be given a reasonable opportunity to review and comment
on the TIP before its approval by the MPO and the Governor. From an
intermodal perspective, in developing metropolitan and statewide plans
and programs, access to ports, airports and intermodal transportation
facilities are important Interstate and International commerce
considerations.
The MPO goal statement above requires balancing multiple goalstransportation, energy, and air quality. The planning process requires
addressing even more factors-social, economic, environmental and
land use considerations. Overriding all of these requirements is the fiscal constraint. The balancing of all these competing issues limits the
range of options and certainly to reach consensus will be extremely challenging. This will require extensive skills in conflict resolution and multiple goal compromises to produce required products such as plans and
programs. For example, to reduce Vehicle Miles Travel, which is a Clean
Air Act goal in non-attainment areas, without sacrificing economic
growth or having out-migration of population, the transportationmust be
more efficiently utilized. This has land use implications such as better
land development configurations and close alignment of affordable
housing and employment centers. 2 °
This last aspect is extremely important because the Southeastern
Wisconsin area is a non-attainment area for Clean Air Act purposes.
Not only do the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require Southeastern Wisconsin to decrease its ozone-forming emissions by three percent
every year until the year 2007, but the Act also requires an overall reduction in emissions by fifteen percent by 1996.121
Technological changes, such as more stringent automobile inspections, tailpipe standards, and reformulated gasoline and fume vacuums

120. All text in Part 2A to this point is excerpted. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text for source.
121. Transit Choices: Light Rail Transit and Express Bus Options for Metro Milwaukee,
Wis. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION NEWSLETTER, Fall, 1992, at 2.
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at gasoline pumps, will help the region towards this goal." The Clean
Air Act also requires employers in Southeastern Wisconsin with over
100 employees at one site to develop plans to reduce the number of employees driving to work alone."z These requirements illustrate the environmental pressures being placed upon the planners and politicians
within the region to come up with an environmentally friendly urban
transportation network.
ISTEA is an example of legislation that revised and gave further direction to the Federal-Aid Highway Program. Some funding programs
were continued with minor changes, while others restructured. Financing was increased almost fifty percent annually over the previous multiyear legislation. The ten themes influence program management and the
delivery of needed mobility improvements. The planning processes in
most States (including Wisconsin) will be modified to meet ISTEA
expectations.
It is quite clear that ISTEA will have an impact on what is done in
Wisconsin and the Southeastern Wisconsin region. Consistent with the
major themes of the Act, planners and elected officials will be faced with
the task of effectively and efficiently updating the transportation network that is already in place. Increased efficiency, effectiveness, and intermodality are clearly mandated by ISTEA. Within the context of
Southeastern Wisconsin, several conclusions may be drawn from this
Act:
1. The existing transit system that is currently in place will have
to be adjusted in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
2. Transportation management systems and other mechanisms
to discourage excessive automobile use will have to be more concretely implemented, in stark contrast to the half-hearted efforts
over the past fifteen years.
3. The proposed light rail and transit system may help to achieve
the objectives of ISTEA.
4. ISTEA does not explicitly prohibit the construction of additionalfreeway segments, whether they are new corridorsor whether
they are additionsto the currentsystem. In fact, ISTEA does allow
the conversion of transit money into highway purposes. This is
entirely consistent with the major themes of ISTEA, particularly
the themes of flexibility of planning and the transferability of
funds for uses that meet particular local needs. And in fact, additional freeway construction will help the region achieve the goals
122. Id
123. Id.
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of efficiency, effectiveness, and modality. ISTEA provides an excellent opportunity for Southeastern Wisconsin planners and
elected officials to help craft a balanced transportation system
that efficiently and effectively meets the needs of people and
commerce in the region.
B.

The Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended through 1990), is designed to
regulate air quality through joint state and local regulation."24 Under
the Clean Air Act, a state is responsible for setting emission levels for
the various sources of regulated pollutants within the state. The most
significant exception to this rule is the federal preemption of state authority to regulate automobile emissions. 125 However, states are still
able to regulate automobile emissions indirectly through transportation
control plans. 26 Transportation control plans regulate the use of
automobiles. 27 They involve the adoption by the state of measures
designed to ensure that the pollution control equipment is working properly, programs designed to encourage the use of car pools and mass
transit, and other policies designed to decrease automobile use.128 These
measures are the only means by which states may regulate automobile
pollutants. Because automobiles are a significant source of carbon dioxide emissions, transportation control plans would be an essential component of any effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean
Air Act.
Under the Act, states are required to develop plans for reducing
emissions of pollutants into the air, called State Implementation Plans
124. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. The Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 were a radical reworking of the Clean Air Act of 1963. See Clean Air
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. The 1963 Clean Air Act was amended several
times between 1963 and 1970 in a less dramatic fashion. See Clean Air Act Amendment of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89675, 80 Stat. 954; and Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. After 1970,
the Clean Air Act was amended in 1974, 1977, and again in 1990. See Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319,88 Stat. 246,256; Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; and Clean Air Act Amendments of

1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. See also FRANK P. GRAD,

TREATISE ON ENvRmoN-

§ 2.03[1] (1991) (discussing the Clean Air Act prior to 1970).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1988).
126. Id § 7410(a)(2)(B).
127. Id. § 7408(f)(1)(A).
128. For a more extensive discussion on transportation control plans and their pressing
need for adoption, see Michael T. Donnellan, Note, TransportationControl Plans Under the
1990 Clean Air Act as a Means for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 16 VT. L. REv. 711
(1992).
MENTAL LAW,
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(SIPs), bringing state air quality into compliance with federal standards.
In connection with these standards, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency must publish proposed primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), and the
Administrator may not consider economic and technical factors when
setting NAAQSs. 12 9
Once a NAAQS has been adopted by the federal government, the
responsibility for implementing the standard lies with the states, 3 ° who
will then submit an implementation plan to the Administrator within
nine months after the NAAQS is promulgated, specifying how the primary and secondary standards will be achieved for each criteria pollutant, generally called a SIP.
Automobiles present a special problem for state and federal regulators because automobile emissions are not stationary sources. Therefore, automobile tailpipe emissions are regulated under a separate
section of the Clean Air Act,' 3 ' standards being set by Congress and the
EPA.132 However, unlike the process for setting NAAQSs, regulators
setting mobile source standards may consider such factors as cost, technological feasibility, and the availability of a sufficient number of
Thus, mobile source standards
automobiles to satisfy consumer demand.
33
are not as stringent as NAAQSs.'
States are prohibited from promulgating any additional regulations
regarding tailpipe emissions of new cars by an explicit preemption section contained within the Clean Air Act.134 The preemption provision
appears to protect automobile manufacturers from the burdens of multiple, diverse emissions standards, but it also prevents states from using an
effective method for reducing automobile pollutants.
Anti-highway construction lobbies, primarily environmental groups
and community based organizations, often claim that the Clean Air Act
prohibits additional freeway construction in the Southeastern Wisconsin
area. The Clean Air Act states no such prohibition. In fact, it can be
argued that the forcing of traffic onto the arterial street system that
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a)(1)-(2) (1988). These proposed standards must be finalized after
a 90-day period for the submission of written comments. Id. §§ 7409(a)(1)(B), 7409(2). The
promulgated standards are listed at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.12 (1990).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a)(1988).
131. Idr § 7521-7574 (1988).
132. Id. § 7521(b) (1988).
133. See GRAD, supra note 124 § 2.06[3].

134. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1988). California was granted a waiver from this exemption. Id.
§ 7543(b). If it is necessary in order to comply with Clean Air Act standards, other states may
adopt California standards. IM § 7507.
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would otherwise use a completed freeway system actually increases pollution because automobiles do not operate as efficiently in stop-and-go
traffic as they do on freeways. This does not include the variety of degradations that neighborhoods suffer from increased local traffic.
There is no doubt that the Clean Air Act needs to be progressively
strengthened to reduce automobile emissions. There is also no doubt
that this will be a difficult and daunting task. However, by any rational
measurement, the air quality in Southeastern Wisconsin is better now
than it was twenty years ago, despite annual per capita increases in driving. It must also be recognized that air pollution in the region is due to
other stationary and non-stationary sources, such as industrial plants and
gasoline lawnmowers. Higher air quality standards must be promulgated
and enforced. However, placing all of the blame on automobiles misstates the true nature of pollution in the region. Effective air quality
enforcement can only occur when elected officials and people recognize
the true sources of pollution.
Some may argue that additional freeway construction makes no
sense when policymakers are trying to make people change their driving
habits. Setting aside the patronizing implications, this argument is illogical because people are going to drive their cars regardless of whether a
certain freeway segment is built or not. There are many reasons why
people are continuing to drive their automobiles at such a pace; however, it makes no sense to argue that building 1, 5 or 17 more miles of
freeway will really alter
driving habits or add appreciably to the pollu35
tion in the region.1
The Clean Air Act and ISTEA statutes have a strong regulatory
presence within the arena of transportation planning. Properly utilized,
however, the result would be a cleaner, safer and more efficient transportation system in Southeastern Wisconsin. The mistake is to characterize both statutes as being anti-highway and pro-transit. In reality, both
statutes complement each other, by mandating cleaner air within the
context of a balanced transportation system. Dominant policymakers in
the Southeastern Wisconsin region, like the Mayor of Milwaukee, characterize these statutes as prohibiting highway and freeway construction.
Neither statute mandates such a prohibition, and ISTEA expressly justi135. Evidence from Australia suggests that building 3 or 30 more miles of freeway could
very well increase vehicle-miles of travel (VMT). Kuemmel, supra note 88 (Sept. 1994). Professor Kuemmel's point is that efforts to reduce congestion through construction are just as
likely to deteriorate air quality as improve it, considering the requirement of the Clean Air
Act that highway improvements must demonstrate that air quality will improve. ld.
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fies further freeway construction in proper circumstances. Is Milwaukee
ripe for further freeway construction? Given the fact that no major additions to the system have been made for twenty-five years, and considering the lag time between project proposal and completion, a period of
thirty-five years with no major improvements to the freeway system is sufficient justification in itself to resume freeway construction in the Milwaukee area. The discussion will now turn to the light rail and transit
proposal that has been placed before the Milwaukee body politic.
VII.

Tim LIGHT RAIL AND TRANsrr PROPOSAL

The light rail and transit proposal that is the preliminary recommendation of the Milwaukee East-West Corridor Transit Study Advisory
Committee consists of: (1) a busway for carpools and buses from the
City of Waukesha to downtown Milwaukee; 3 6 (2) reserved bus lanes
along Fond du Lac Avenue, North 35th Street, and Wisconsin Avenue in
the City of Milwaukee; and (3) an express light rail transit route running
south from Glendale to downtown Milwaukee, serving the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and continuing westward to the Milwaukee Regional Medical Center campus. These improvements are supported by a
thirty percent increase in local bus service in the Milwaukee and Waukesha counties. 137
The Study Advisory Committee, chaired by Wisconsin Department
of Transportation Secretary Charles H. Thompson, is composed of the
mayors, county executives, village presidents, and several regional officials who jurisdictions overlap with the East-West (1-94) corridor. They
have met regularly throughout the study to review results and provide
guidance to the study.3 8 The Study Advisory Committee also decided
to analyze funding issues during the first stage of the preliminary engineering, scheduled to begin in the summer of 1994 with expected completion in 1996 or 1997.131 At issue is how to pay for the non-federal
share of costs without using scarce property tax funds.140 The Study Ad136. Governor Tommy Thompson recently signed an order deleting the busway component from the proposal. The implications of this decision, which was supported by Mayor
Norquist, are not clear.
137. Public Invited to Comment on a New Transit Choice, TRANsrr UPDATE (Milwaukee
Transit Associates and Wis. Department of Transportation, Milw., Wis.), Jan., 1994 at 1.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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visory Committee will recommend to Secretary Thompson a formal locally preferred alternative for preliminary engineering analysis.' 41
According to its proponents, this alternative combines the best features of several transit technologies: busways, bus lanes on arterials, and
ight rail transit. The busway provides an economical congestion relieving transit option for the most heavily travelled freeway route in the
state for buses as well as a facility for carpools. The reserved bus lanes
on arterials provide the fastest and most flexible means of connecting
the areas of Milwaukee with the lowest incomes and highest unemployment rate to the major growing job areas. Light rail provides a focus for
high density urban development. 142 The total capital cost for this alternative is $874 million in 1992 dollars, with the costs (in millions) breaking down as follows:
Busway
$257
Light Rail transit
$543
Buses and Diamond lanes
$ 74
$874143
TOTAL CAPITAL COST
Because of the cost of this major transit project, "contributions" will
be required from several levels of government in order to succeed. The
following chart shows the funding plan for the capital costs (in millions
of dollars) of the proposed system, and the funding categories are explained below:
Federal ICE Funds
$289
Authorized Federal Section 3 Funds
$200
Future Federal Section 3 Funds
$194
Federal Bus Funds
$ 35
State and Local Funds
$156
TOTAL CAPITAL COST
$874144
The component parts of this total capital cost were explained by the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation as follows:
The ICE in "Federal ICE" dollars stands for Interstate Cost
Estimate. Wisconsin stands to receive Interstate Highway funds
for a once-planned transitway along 1-94 similar to the proposed
busway. Governor Tommy Thompson, in a December 17, 1993
letter to U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Pefia, re141.
142.
143.
144.

Id at 1.
Id. at 3.
I&
l& at 10.
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quested that these funds be made available for the busway component of [the proposal].
"Authorized Section 3" refers to the Federal Transit Administration New Start program in ISTEA. Cities across the U.S. compete in this program for funds for new major transit projects.
While funds are authorized for Wisconsin, most have not yet been
appropriated, typically appropriations would start during preliminary engineering. These funds are targeted for the light raf component of the plan.
"Future Section 3" funds refers to future authorizations/appropriations that would be needed to complete the project once it
is started with currently authorized funds.
"Federal Bus" refers to the ongoing federal program that assists communities to buy buses and make improvements to the
bus transit system.
Finally, "State and Local" is the non-federal match required
for ICE (15%) and Section 3 funds (20%). It is assumed that the
state and local units of governments would share the non-federal
match. 145
In addition to the initial capital costs to construct the proposed system, there are annual operating costs that must be considered in the
cost/benefit matrix. These costs (in millions of dollars) have been preliminarily determined and are shown below:
$28.0
Expanded Bus Service
$ 7.7
Light Rail Transit
-$ 4.0
-(Credit for Bus Service Replaced)
$ 3.7
Light Rail Net Annual Cost
$31.7146
TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COST
The ultimate test of this proposal is whether it will actually "work"
for the Southeastern Wisconsin region. Upon a full reading of the
materials accompanying the proposal, it is clear that the objectives of the
proposal are to: (1) increase transportation capacity and reduce travel
time through the corridor; (2) improve mobility for the transit dependent, particularly those who live in the inner city; (3) improve air quality
in the region; and (4) stimulate economic development. 147 While no one
who is seriously concerned about the state of transportation in the region can doubt these goals, it is clear that people may disagree about the
methods used to achieve these goals. The transit documents accompany145. 1& at 10-11.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 4.
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ing the proposal make it quite clear that congestion on 1-94 will increase
from five hours per day today to nine hours per day by 2010. This congestion costs drivers thousands of hours of delay, millions of dollars in
lost time, and countless gallons of wasted fuel." However, this congestion is the direct result of the failure to implement the freeway system as
designed and to enact transitand traffic management systems over the past
twenty years. The failure to effectively implement these two key aspects
has left the Milwaukee area with no choice but to accept some version of
the light rail and transit proposal.
VIII.

WISCONSIN TRANSLINKS 21: A MULTIMODAL
PLANNING PROCESS

WISCONSIN TRANSLINKS 21, a report prepared by the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation (WisDOT), provides a critical look at the
Milwaukee County Freeway System and its critical role in the urban
transportation system. The Mission Statement for the report states the
following:
TRANSLINKS 21-Wisconsin's 21st century transportation
plan-will outline a comprehensive transportation system that
moves people and goods efficiently, strengthens our economy,
protects our environment, and supports our quality of life. Working with DOT, the public will identify Wisconsin's transportation
needs-and help make tomorrow's transportation choices.' 49
The report acknowledges at the outset that "the freeways in Milwaukee are obsolete, unsafe, congested and crumbling. Without extensive rehabilitation, they simply cannot continue to function as a crucial part of
Milwaukee's and Wisconsin's transportation system."' 50 Drawing the
analogy that the freeway system is one leg of the "three-legged stool"
representing transportation in the area-also consisting of arterial
streets and mass transit-the report does not advocate the construction
of new freeways or even for the addition of unrestricted lanes to the
existing system.151

The report provides excellent analysis of the freeways importance to
the City and the region, the aging and crumbling nature of the existing
system, and the obsolete design of the interchanges linking the various
148. I& at 5.
149. The CriticalRole of the Milwaukee County Freeway System in the Urban Transportation System, WISCONSIN TRANSLiNKS 21 (Wis. Department of Transportation, July 1994),
Foreword.
150. Id.at 1.
151. Id.
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freeway segments. 52 However, the key features of this report are: (1)
and (2) the alternathe reasons why the freeway system is so congested;
1 53
tives for action over the next twenty-five years.
The reasons why the freeway system is so congested are many: (1)
explosive growth that has occurred in the areas adjacent to the freeways;
(2) the continual flight of commerce out of the City of Milwaukee; (3)
increased use of the freeways by trucks and the single car driver; (4) the
poor design of the current freeway system; and (5) the incomplete nature
of the freeway system.154 The WisDOT report discusses in length the
first three reasons for congestion and touches upon the fourth. However, the fifth reason, the incomplete nature of the freeway system, is
given two sentences worth of treatment, 55 which is simply disproportionate to its importance in the public policy debate. The freeway system
was designed to be completed in its entirety, not partially, and WisDOT
took the politically "safe" course of action by not discussing the incomplete nature of the system in more depth.
WisDOT outlines four alternative courses of action for the next
twenty-five years:
1. The Maintenance Only Option, which would involve performing routine maintenance and patching road and bridges as
needed, but making no significant improvements. WisDOT does
not recommend this course of action.'5 6 This course of action
would cost $625 million over twenty-five years, or approximately
$25 million per year. 5 7 This course of action is simply an extension of current state and local policies on the freeway system, policies which have been simply inadequate.
2. Replacement in Kind. This would involve replacing the more
deteriorated portions of the system in conjunction with low-cost
initiatives such as resurfacing, but would not include operational
improvements. Basically, the system would still be a 1960s system
trying, with limited success, to handle traffic volumes it was never
designed for.15 8 This course of action would cost an additional
$828 million over the first alternative over the next twenty-five

152. See id at 1-18.
153. See id. at 19-25.
154. Id. at 19-21.

155. Id. at 21.
156. Id at 22.
157. It

158. Id. at 23.
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years. 159 The implication is that WisDOT does not support this
option.
3. Replacement and Modernization. This would entail modernization and reconstruction of the entire system to make it more
functional, safer, and capable of handling the greater traffic
volumes that are projected through the year 2010, including modernization of the Marquette, Stadium, and Zoo interchanges. 6 °
The estimated cost is $1,290 million over the base figure.'61
4. Modernization plus Other Initiatives, which would add selected HOV or busway improvements to the third alternative.
The cost of this alternative on 1-94 would be that of the third alternative plus an additional $113 million to enable the roadway
and interchanges to accommodate these vehicles. Another $216
million would be necessary to actually construct the facility. 62
All costs are over twenty-five years and are calculated in 1995
dollars. 63 While the WisDOT document does not explicitly say
which alternative they prefer, from the tone of the document it is
clear that the Department would prefer alternative three or four.
The WisDOT report also states in several places that the explosive
growth on the freeway system was not anticipated when it was originally
designed. 64 This is false because one only needs to review the First and
Second Generation Regional Transportation Plans to see that the original freeway was designed because of the projected growth of automobile
and commercial traffic in the region over the next thirty years.
SEWRPC was extremely accurate in its analysis of traffic growth, but the
regionalpolicymakers failed to hear the message. Furthermore, the politics of inaction over the past two decades have made freeway problems
worse by keeping traffic on an uncompleted system and by forcing more
traffic off the system onto an inadequate arterial system. A major result
of directing more traffic onto the arterial system has been denigration of
the City's neighborhoods, resulting in a lower quality of life for Milwaukee residents. 65 Mayor Norquist, who has constantly positioned himself
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id
162. Id at 25.
163. Id
164. Id at 12, 21.
165. In the opinion of one local professional, the failure to complete the freeway system
has not resulted in the denigration of Milwaukee's neighborhoods. Kuemmel, supra note 88.
At the same time, however, he acknowledges that certain arterials on the northwest side have
become "saturated" during rush hour, but believes that this has not had a negative impact on
the northwest side. Id And if there has been some impact, it would be less than five percent
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as "neighborhood oriented," contributed to a lower quality of life for
City residents by adopting policies that forced more traffic onto City
streets. He has not been held accountable by the electorate for these
actions.
There is a clear need in the region for a reconstructed freeway system
that utilizes cutting edge technology and more efficiently moves people
and goods throughout the system. Therefore, alternatives that rely on
replacing segments of the system as they fail are simply inadequate responses to this problem. Furthermore, there is some need for busway
and HOV improvements to the freeway system, particularly with respect
to the 1-94 corridor. These improvements, however, will only make marginal improvements to the overall capacity of the system. True improvements with respect to capacity will only occur by enlarging the freeway
system. An enlarged system will be able to handle increased transit
routes as well as increased busway opportunities. The failure to fully
construct the freeway system as originally designed meant lost opportunities for transit, because all freeway segments contained extensions of
the current transit system. Furthermore, by failing to preserve the
rights-of-way for these facilities, opportunities were lost for future capital improvements. The DOT report, therefore, goes a long way towards
addressing the problems of the existing system, but fails to "hit the home
run" by avoiding the issues of the uncompleted nature of the system and
extensions of the current segments.
Policymakers in Southeastern Wisconsin have known for thirty years
that congestion on local freeways would reachpresent levels, yet failed to
take any meaningfulproactive steps to address this problem. Planners at
WisDOT and SEWRPC have made it quite clear that the freeway system
is a "bare bones" system that is not designed to accommodate growth.
Many of the people who opposed the remaining segments of the freeways are now in favor of the transit proposal, arguing that the congestion
justifies the proposal. In reality, however, they are justifying their failure
to act on the issue over the past twenty years. The failure to significantly
invest in the regional arterial and freeway system over the past twenty
years now forces the electorate into choosing the proposal almost by default. There are no plans to expand any existing freeways or to build any
new ones in the future. There is no choice, or so goes the common political wisdom in Milwaukee.

of the neighborhoods. Id.According to him, less than ten percent of the arterials in the City
of Milwaukee are congested at any time.
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According to a transit engineer employed by WisDOT, freeway congestion is an excellent justification for the building of a light rail or HOV
system.1 66 However, construction of this system will not actually relieve
the congestion that currently exists on the freeway system. 167 In addition, "[t]he current political climate is not very favorable to expanding
and building new freeways although they could probably be justified
solely on capacity and congestion criteria.' 1 68 If this is the case, can light
rail or transit costs be justified if it cannot be proven that the project will
not relieve freeway congestion? One major success of the freeway system is that it succeeded in reducing arterial congestion and accommodating vehicular growth that existed on Milwaukee roadways prior to
construction of the freeways. A project of this stature and cost must
make a major contribution to the transportation system in terms of efficiency, mobility, and congestion reduction. Preliminary information
seems to indicate that the light rail and transit proposal fails in this
regard.
IX.

PROsPiEcrS FOR THE FUTURE

Freeway expansion in Milwaukee County is currently constrained by
narrow rights-of-way, existing freeway structures, adjacent development,
and the Clean Air Act of 1990. These constraints do not mean that it is
impossible, but they do make it more difficult and long-term in nature. 6 9
What does implementation of the light rail and transit proposal mean
to the people of Southeastern Wisconsin? Quite clearly, the people who
will benefit most from this proposal are inner city residents who in most
cases do not or will not own an automobile. Due to the mandates of the
Clean Air Act, you may see greater ride-sharing and transit usages,
which should in the short run temper the congestion on the region's freeway system. It will be useful to see whether the light rail and transit
proposal will actually reduce congestion, noise, and pollution on the region's secondary arterial network, items that decrease the quality of life
in Milwaukee's neighborhoods. One of the ironies of the decision to
demap the remaining freeway segments and substitute them with improved surface arterials is that in the former situation, engineers can design freeways to reduce noise and visible damage to the landscape, while
166. Letter from Michael J. Maierle, Senior Transportation Planner, Transit System Development, WisDOT, to James J. Casey, Jr. (Nov. 11, 1993)(on file with author).
167. Id.
168. ld.
169. Memorandum from Michael J. Maierle, Senior Transportation Planner, Transit System Development, WisDOT, to James J. Casey, Jr. (Jan. 19, 1994) (on file with author).
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no such opportunities exist if you simply widen a two lane highway.
While Mayor John Norquist opposed freeway construction on the basis
that it divided and destroyed neighborhoods, he actually assisted in the
degradation of the neighborhoods by forcing more traffic onto the arterial street system which in fact makes neighborhoods less livable. People
should not be deceived into believing that improving or building a four
lane arterials will completely replace limited access freeways. The
problems that exist in the Milwaukee region are a direct result
of faulty
170
policymaking by local, state, and national representatives.
Policymakersmust learn from the mistakes of the past twenty years. It
has already been shown that no law prohibits additional freeway construction provided that its need is established. Policymakers must have
the political gumption to make these decisions even if portions of the
electorate are opposed, because the policymakers have the responsibility
to advance the public interest, not simply a neighborhood's interest.
Neighborhood and community-based organizations are, by definition,
not primarily concerned with regional interests. Rather, they are primarily concerned with their own local, parochial interests. The composition of the regional body politic indicates that complete support for
either transit-based or freeway-based improvements will never be received. Some opposition must be expected.
As a result, policymakers in the Southeastern Wisconsin area must
revisit the possibility of expanding the regional freeway system in Milwaukee and Waukesha counties, the two counties most desperately in
need of assistance. Taking into consideration the current status of the
demapped freeway segments, the Author offers the following locations
that are most suitable for construction, recognizing that no significant
improvement to the regional transportationnetwork can occur without
disruption:

170. The essence of the phrase "the politics of congestion and implementation" can be
stated as follows: Based upon the premise that automobiles are inherently responsible for all
pollution and congestion in the Milwaukee area, as well as a host of economic and social
problems, policymakers adopt a transportation public policy that is grounded in short term
political benefits, not long term regional gain. These policies seek to unrealisticallyrestrict the
use of automobiles by the general populace and pursue political strategies that shift public
funds from highway construction and maintenance to mass transit and light rail alternatives.
In essence, policymakers force congestion upon the general populace in order to shift the
tenor of the public debate to alternative sources of transportation.
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The Park-West Freeway Corridor.

This corridor would provide relief to 1-94 to the south and provide a
bypass around the downtown area to traffic not originating or arriving
downtown. At a length of 2.5 miles, this corridor is not significant in
terms of length. Its importance has been well documented over the past
thirty years. While there has been some development in the corridor,
most notably the SteelTech Manufacturing Company complex and the
Milwaukee County Transit Facility,17 ' these facilities could be moved to
accommodate the freeway, with direct access to the freeway for transportation purposes. As has been stated by a Staff Assistant to Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist, "[r]edeveloping the Park-West corridor has
been a complex, slow process,"'172 an acknowledgement that businessmen are not "knocking down doors" to move their businesses into the
Park West corridor. The piecemeal development of the corridor since
1978 indicates that the lands still vacant will remain that way into the
future. The City has been repeatedly rebuffed over the past fifteen years
to develop the corridor, especially in the area of North 27th Street and
West North Avenue.' 73 The Park-West Freeway lands are far better utilized as a transportation corridor than as the site for ad hoc, piecemeal,
and marginal economic development.
B.

The Stadium-South Freeway Corridor.

This corridor, approximately 3.5 miles in length, would serve to alleviate traffic on 1-894 to the west and 1-94 to the east, as well as primary
171. Development in the Park-West Freeway corridor in the last decade includes a Milwaukee County Transit facility, Johnson's Park, the Booker T. Ashe subdivision, the state
headquarters of Second Harvester, and an apartment building for the elderly. Porter, supra
note 70. Future development in the corridor may include a rental housing project and anIndustrial Jobs Banks that the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee is negotiating. Id.
172. ld.
173. The City of Milwaukee recently announced the creation of the North Avenue Commerce Park, an industrial park located on Park-West land near the intersection of North 27th
Street and West North Avenue. Whether this industrial park is successful remains to be seen,
and the results may not be known for another 10 to 20 years. If the park is successful in
attracting high wage jobs, then it will be judged a success. But if it attracts low wage, marginally productive companies, or remains vacant over the long term, that will constitute further
evidence that the Park West corridor should have been developed for its original purpose-an
eight lane limited access freeway. The question can be raised again. If the Park-West Freeway
had been built, would the City have been more successful in luring companies back into the
City of Milwaukee? The evidence gathered to date by SEWRPC indicates that recent substantial industrial and commercial growth occurred adjacent to constructed freeways. There is
no evidence to suggest that this could not occur in the City of Milwaukee.
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arterials such as South 108th Street, South 76th Street, and South 27th
Street. In terms of disruption, the corridor does not require relocation
as extensive as did the Stadium Freeway-North, but its importance to the
overall system has been well documented. There has been development
along this corridor since it was demapped; however, no improvement in
the freeway system can be accomplished without industrial and residential disruption. This corridor is no different. 174
The environmental impacts of the Stadium-South were found to be as
follows:
The most significant impact of the project is the displacement
of existing residential, commercial, industrial and park development to provide the needed right of way. Recreational land is
taken for [two] County parks and [two] public school sites. At
[two] of these sites, replacement land in excess of the amount
taken is provided. At the other sites joint use techniques reduce
the harmful effects of the takings. The increase of vehicular traffic in the freeway corridor will adversely affect air quality and create a noise problem. Project-generated air quality impacts will
not interfere with achieving or maintaining national standards.
The proposedproject is in conformance with the State Implementation Planfor achieving compliance with the NationalAmbient Air
Quality Standards and the provisions of the Clean Air Act, as
amended. Several local areas, where noise abatement measures
would be ineffective or not practical, require exception to the
noise standards. Noise abatement measures, where warranted on
a cost-benefit basis, will be constructed. There will be no major
impact on wildlife concentrations, ecological communities, plant
associations, natural streams or bodies of water.
The improved traffic service and mobility due to the highway
improvement will have a positive social and economic effect on
citizens, business, and industry in the corridor.175

174. The Final Environmental Statement for the Stadium-South freeway was approved.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION ET AL., At-

U.S.

tachment to 1 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAIJSECTION 4(F) STATEmENT ADMINIsTRATIvE ACTION

FOR STADIUM FREEvAY (1976). A review of this two volume report indicates that local,
county, and state officials involved in the planning of this freeway took all the necessary steps
to accommodate local concerns about the negative effects of this freeway by providing a variety of mitigation measures. These included the purchase of lands near parks to offset lands

taken for the freeway, the provision of landscaping techniques, noise mitigation techniques,
and other engineering techniques.

175. Id. at 4-4a.
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C. The Stadium-North Freeway Corridor.
This freeway should be extended from its current terminus at North
47th and West Lloyd Streets to the vicinity of North 60th and West Burleigh Streets, as authorized by the Milwaukee County electorate in November 1974. This 2.5 mile extension would increase the usefulness of
the entire Stadium Freeway, which has never been developed to its full
potential. Arterial streets in the area, primarily North and Burleigh Avenues, could be serviced by the freeway, providing a transportation network conducive to attracting business. It is recognized, however, that
the entire length of this freeway could never be built unless the "proper"
elected officials were in place at the local and state levels.
D. Extension of the Lake Arterial.
Despite WISDOT's termination of this project last year, the Lake
Arterial should be extended from its current terminus at Layton Avenue
to the Milwaukee-Racine County line. This would provide relief to
those travelling 1-94 to the west and provide businesses in lower Milwaukee County, Racine County and Kenosha County easier access to the
Port of Milwaukee and Mitchell International Airport. Extension of the
Lake Arterial would also require WisDOT to "correctly build" the portion of the Lake Arterial under construction.
One further option would be whether arterial roadways could be developed in the freeway corridors instead of full-scale freeways. The
rights-of-way required would not be as extensive, resulting in less disruption to the local neighborhood. These arterials, however, would at least
enable the freeway system to work in a more consistent manner and result in less congestion on the freeway and arterial systems. These corridors, like in the first two generation plans, could be outfitted for transit
service, providing those without automobiles greater ease of travel.
These recommendations, if implemented, may also eliminate the need to
expand existing freeways. According to Kurt Bauer, Executive Director
of SEWRPC, no studies have been made to estimate the costs of reopening the uncompleted freeway corridors. 1 76 He went on to further state:
The perceptions and attitudes of the elected State, county, and
local officials concerned is such that undertaking such
studies,
77
which would require funding, is politically infeasible.
176. Bauer, supra note 69.
177. Id.
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The suggestion to revisit the issue of additional freeway development
will open up the same issues of support and opposition that existed in
the regional body politic in the 1960s and 1970s. However, opponents of
further freeway development must recognize that their total reliance on
the transit alternative, coupled with no improvements to the freeway system and small improvements of the arterial street system, is not the
whole answer to congestion in the Milwaukee area. It certainly is not a
policy that will meet the needs of the region into the next century.
Given the lag time between proposal and construction of freeways (approximately ten years), policymakers must immediately address these
issues.
The analysis of the decisionmaking process for construction of the
existing system and demapping of recommended segments, utilized
through Professor Waste's paradigm, illustrates the pitfalls that accompany public policymaking. The key to implementing further freeway development lies in characterizing the issue as being regional in importance
and de-emphasizing the neighborhood disruption aspect of it. As the
discussions on policymaking processes in the region have illustrated,
transit and light rail proponents must politically compromise on their
steadfast assertions that no freeway construction can occur in the future,
because transportation professionals at the State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation have maintained that reliance on light rail and
transit proposals alone will not solve the problem.
There is no doubt that the improvement of the transportation network in the Southeastern Wisconsin area will be multi-modal in character, i.e., a recognition that improvements need to be made to the
highway and mass transit elements of the system. 178 Unfortunately, the
issue of transportation system improvement in the Southeastern Wisconsin area is made problematic by the decision of local and state politicians
to demap every transportation corridor in the greater Milwaukee area,
forcing changes to be made within a very narrow band of options.1 7 9
178. See Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth
Management ComprehensiveApproaches to Resolving America's Major Quality of Life Crisis,
24 Loy. L.A.L. RPv. 915 (1991) (strongly arguing in favor of a multi-modal approach of transportation congestion). The article by Freilich and White also contains some short yet cogent
descriptions of emerging state and regional approaches to traffic congestion: California, Florida, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont and Washington.
179. Politicians in the Milwaukee area, particularly Mayor John Norquist, have ignored a
basic virtue of transportation corridors as "unifying frameworks for the construction and use
of transportation facilities, financing mechanisms and regulatory techniques. Transportation
corridorsserve as an organizingframework forfinancialandgrowth management tools." Id. at
928. (emphasis added).
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This Article has argued that the policymakers in the Southeastern Wisconsin area must recognize that reliance on mass transit solutions to the
unique problems of traffic congestion in the region will not suffice over
the long run. Regionalpolicymakers must recognize that the decisions to
demap every transportationcorridorin Milwaukee County was a mistake.
Steps must be taken to reopen the now dormant transportation corridors
or establish new transportation corridors in Milwaukee County, including a new Milwaukee County referendum on freeway construction.
Based upon the "Milwaukee experience" with construction of the
freeway system, the following political conclusions are apparent: (1)
elected officials must make transportation decisions from a long-term
perspective and resist supporting policies that produce short-term political benefits and no long-term benefits; (2) elected officials must defer to
the expertise and judgment of regional planners and engineers when it
comes to issues of transportation mobility and efficiency; (3) elected officials must implement the results of public referenda in a timely fashion;
and (4) elected officials must recognize that there is a time to discuss and
a time to implement. Endless debate, with no action, is not a public
good.
With respect to the needs of the Southeastern Wisconsin region, the
following actions should be taken: (1) public referendums on renewed
freeway construction should be held in each of the constituent counties
of SEWRPC; (2) public funding should be released to determine the
costs of reopening closed freeway corridors, including the Park-West
corridor; (3) the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, with assistance from SEWRPC, should begin cost analyses of the remaining freeway extensions; (4) the Wisconsin Department of Transportation should
reverse its decision to forgo construction of the Lake Arterial through
Milwaukee County; (5) the Light Rail and Transit proposal should be
studied further; (6) appropriate steps should be taken by the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation to rehabilitate, upgrade and modernize
the existing freeway system, including the major interchanges in Milwaukee County;180 and (7) continuing efforts should also be made to in180. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation recently announced three highway
projects totaling nearly $190 million, to be completed in the early 21st century: the Eau Claire
Bypass, completion of the Oconomowoc Bypass, and widening and rehabilitation of U.S.
Highway 151 south of Madison. Why is none of the state money being funneled into Milwaukee County? The sheer volume of money spent by WisDOT on highway construction
projects, not to mention the availability of federal highway money, should lay to rest once and
for all the notion that no money is available for the Milwaukee County freeway system.
Elected officials in the State of Wisconsin have simply chosen to spend the money in other
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crease ridership levels on the Milwaukee County Transit system, depress
automobile use on the freeway system, and increase technological improvements to automobiles and other users of gasoline. Continued efforts should also be made to decrease pollution from stationary sources,
including industrial and commercial plants.
These recommendations are a "tall order." Nonetheless, they are
necessary because local and state policymakers have ignored the transportation needs of the Southeastern Wisconsin region for the past twenty
years. The policy "prescriptions" implemented by the dominant political
actors have failed to address these pressing needs. The automobile will
remain the dominant mode of personal transportation into the foreseeable future. Local freeways will remain the major arteries which link
Milwaukee commercially to the rest of the United States. The sooner
elected officials accept these conclusions as fact, the sooner the region
can get on with the business of resolving these transportation issues.

areas of the state, despite the fact that the regional freeway and highway system is in dire need
of repair and expansion.

